{"id":198,"date":"2012-04-29T08:44:16","date_gmt":"2012-04-29T15:44:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?page_id=198"},"modified":"2024-08-26T15:29:00","modified_gmt":"2024-08-26T22:29:00","slug":"articles","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?page_id=198","title":{"rendered":"Publications"},"content":{"rendered":"<\/fb:like><\/span>

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Applebaum (2024) A Phenomenology of Mindfulness Practice in Sufism in S. Ferrarello & C. Hadjioannou (Eds.),\u00a0The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>This chapter models an approach to the phenomenological study of practitioners’ experiences of mindfulness meditation. I draw primarily upon Husserl and Fink’s phenomenological philosophy and the existential phenomenological method of qualitative research in psychology that originated at Duquesne University in the 1960’s. The mindfulness practice examined is that of “meditative remembrance” or silent dhikr<\/em> originating in classical Sufism, as practiced within a contemporary, traditionally authorized Sufi lineage. This study examines dhikr<\/em> as a distinct form of mindfulness meditation, exemplifying how phenomenology can explore the meanings of meditators’ narratives. In parallel I seek to convey the relevance of Husserl and Fink’s exploration of self and world-constitution for the study of meditation: in particular, phenomenology’s retracing of the generative flow of constituting consciousness which underlies-and is in a certain sense prior to-the personal ego.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Applebaum (2023)\u00a0Dhikr\u00a0<\/em>as Mindfulness: Meditative Remembrance in Sufism<\/a>. Journal of Humanistic Psychology<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Mindfulness practices adapted from Theravada Buddhism have become widespread among many <\/span> in Western societies who seek stress reduction and greater present-centeredness. Less well <\/span> known is the mindfulness practice in Sufism\u2013the mystical path of Islam\u2013known as meditative <\/span> remembrance (<\/span>dhikr<\/span><\/em>). While mindfulness is often understood as a self-help <\/span> technique, the aim of Buddhist and Sufi meditative paths is not limited to enhancing <\/span> the well-being of a self that is envisioned as strictly bounded. Rather, both <\/span> meditative paths aim at unitive mystical experience, which is held to profoundly transform the <\/span> meaning of the practitioner\u2019s selfhood as such. Whereas Buddhism\u2019s non-self doctrine is <\/span> generally understood to hold that personal selfhood is an illusion, this is not the case for Akbari <\/span> Sufism. This inquiry takes a phenomenological approach, exploring the varied meanings of being <\/span> or \u201chaving\u201d a self in the context of mindfulness, and contrasting these with the humanistic <\/span> psychology of Abraham Maslow. I contrast Theravada and Akbari Sufism\u2019s understandings of <\/span> the aim of meditation and the meanings of selfhood and compares both traditions with Abraham <\/span> Maslow\u2019s view of self-transcendence.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Applebaum (2019) Remembrance: A Husserlian Phenomenology of Sufi Practice<\/a>, Journal of Speculative Philosophy<\/p>\n

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The study seeks to answer the phenomenological question: what in essence is religious experience\u2014specifically, the lived-experience of \u201cremembrance\u201d (dhikr<\/em>) in Sufi practice within the schools of Sufism shaped by the \u201cGreatest Master,\u201d Ibn al-\u2018Arabi (1165-1240)? The eidetic structure of remembrance is proposed as: the awakening of the individuated human subject to recollecting the primordial ground of his or her identity as a dynamic instantiation of the Absolute. This is simultaneously experienced as the subject becoming the object of remembrance\u2014that is, being remembered by the Absolute. This transforms the psychological ego\u2019s relationship to her\/his own embodied, affective, and cognitive living, as the \u201ccenter of gravity\u201d of that ego shifts from an egocentric one\u2014that is, an identification with the natural attitude standpoint of the personal ego\u2014to progressively greater centeredness in the transcendental ego as a locus of ongoing world-constitution and primordial self-presence, while nevertheless living as a unique individual.<\/p>\n

Applebaum (2018) The I and the We: Psychological Reflections on Husserl’s Egology<\/a> in\u00a0Phenomenology and the Social Context of Psychiatry, <\/em>M. Englander (Ed.)<\/p>\n

\"Applebaum<\/strong><\/p>\n

This chapter seeks\u00a0to answer the following question: How can a Husserlian phenomenology contribute to psychiatry\u2019s understanding of and ability to work within the field of social interrelatedness–that which is lived by a we, not merely by an I?\u00a0I begin with first-person description in an interpretive dialogue with Husserl\u2019s writings on egology and its relationship to the \u201cyou\u201d and thus the \u201cwe.\u201d In explicating the data so given, I rely\u00a0on both Husserl\u2019s static and genetic phenomenology. I work with personal, experiential data because the data of phenomenological psychological research is intimate–and in seeking to bring Husserlian insights down into the soil and messiness of everyday psychological lived-experience, we work in a primary way with raw, first-person narratives. This chapter is not intended as a full-fledged psychological study; rather, it is intended to exemplify how data opens to the phenomenological eye. In this case the narrative material is my own, but the data might just as easily come from an Other–in any case, our lives are the flesh without which the eidos<\/em> would be disembodied, lacking life and warmth. For psychological researchers, the embodied lived-experiences given to us in in the form of narratives are more than mere raw material for the scholarly ascription of essences–they are the human setting through which the eide are clarified in order to return to us, incarnate, pregnant with meaning for future living. This essay aims to contribute to illuminating a Husserlian sense of the \u201cwe\u201d by exploring the layers of the \u201cI\u201d and its origins and embeddedness, for Husserl, in I-You relations–that is, within the we-world of companionship (socius<\/em>) and community.<\/p>\n

Yoshida (2015) Reconsideration on Living with Multiple Psychologies \u5341\u725b\u56f3\u3000\u633f\u5165\u6e08<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Pic-AkihiroYoshida-20130601a\"<\/a>YOSHIDA Akihiro writes:\u00a0My motive to investigate the problem of Living with Multiple Psychologies has\u00a0its origin in my own personal history of wondering in the chaotic world of multiple psychologies. Upon reflection, every time at the critical turning points in my life in the world of multiple psychologies, I was at a loss which new way to choose and decide to go further, and I eagerly wished to have good advices, if available, from any of my knowledgeable seniors, teachers and\/or senior psychologists. However, I was not always able to get enlightening and encouraging advices. Now, as an old psychologist, who has my own personal experiences of wondering through multiple psychologies, I wish I could offer at least some helpful advices, —-which, when I was young, I had desired desperately in vain, —-to our younger generations who might be, consciously or unconsciously, now desperately wishing to have advices just as I was desiring years ago.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Applebaum (2014) Intentionality and Narrativity in Phenomenological Research<\/a> Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology<\/p>\n

Abs\"Applebaumtract<\/strong>:\u00a0According to Husserl scholars such as Mohanty (1989) description and interpretation coexist within Husserl\u2019s work\u00a0and are envisioned as complementary rather than mutually exclusive approaches to inquiry. This essay argues that exploring the implications of this philosophical complementarity for psychological research would require distinguishing between the multiple meanings of \u201cinterpretation\u201d and between differing modes of interpretation within qualitative data. Husserl\u2019s model of passive and active intentionality and Ricoeur\u2019s theory of narrativity are examined in order to explore their relevance for research. It is argued that interview data can demonstrate both actively and passively intended dimensions, and the psychological meaningfulness of this complexity points to the relevance of not only of Husserl\u2019s static analysis but his genetic analysis as well. Likewise, it is argued that Ricoeur\u2019s work on narrativity and narrative identity is invaluable in grasping ways in which narrative data is intrinsically self-interpretive, expresses self-identity, and is both situated within and responsive to the larger social horizon within which the interview is given.<\/p>\n

Englander (2012) The Interview- Data Collection in Descriptive Phenomenological Human Scientific Research<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>: In this article, interviewing from a descriptive, phenomenological, human scientific perspective is examined. Methodological issues are raised in relation to evaluative criteria as well as reflective matters that concern the phenomenological researcher.The data collection issues covered are 1) the selection of participants, 2) the number of participants in a study, 3) the interviewer and the questions, and 4) data collection procedures.Certain conclusions were drawn indicating that phenomenological research methods cannot be evaluated on the basis of an empiricist theory of science, but must be critiqued from within a phenomenological theory of science. Some reflective matters, experienced by the phenomenological researcher, are also elaborated upon.\u00a0-Published in the\u00a0Journal of Phenomenological Psychology<\/a><\/p>\n

Applebaum (2011) Beyond scientism and relativism-Amedeo Giorgi’s Commitment to Human Science<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Applebaum<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>:\u00a0This is my chapter in the festschrift volume celebrating Amedeo Giorgi’s career in phenomenological psychology. I pose the question, why should the scientific status of qualitative psychological researcher be a compelling issue for the next generation of scholars?\u00a0 I explore the criteria for science proposed by Giorgi, and discuss van Manen’s hermeneutic method as an alternate, aestheticizing approach.<\/p>\n

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Applebaum (2007) Considerazioni critiche sui metodi fenomenologici di Moustakas e di van Manen (Critical reflections on the phenomenological methods of Moustakas and van Manen) \u00a0<\/a><\/strong>
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\"Photo<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>: My objective in this paper is to reflect critically on Max van Manen\u2019s Researching Lived Experience<\/i> (1990) and Clark Moustakas\u2019 Phenomenological Research Methods<\/i> (1994) from the standpoint of Amedeo Giorgi\u2019s phenomenological psychological method. Moustakas grasp of the central tenets of Husserl\u2019s phenomenology is interrogated, including his representation of what the psychological and transcendental realms signify for Husserl\u2019s phenomenology. Van Manen\u2019s presentation is questioned as it appears to leave unclarified important differences between hermeneutic and descriptive phenomenology with the result being a variety of epistemological inconsistencies in the research approach as presented.<\/p>\n

Broome (2011) Phenomenological Psychological Dissertation Method Chapter<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>Method Chapter:\u00a0<\/strong>This document is the methodology chapter from Broom\u00e9\u2019s 2011 doctoral dissertation outlining the Descriptive Phenomenological Psychological Method of research as taught by Amedeo P. Giorgi. Giorgi (2009) based his method on Husserl\u2019s descriptive phenomenological philosophy as an alternative epistemology for human science research. This method section references Giorgi\u2019s work and the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others. Each step of Giorgi\u2019s (2009) modified Husserlian method is described and explained in the context of doing psychological research on the lived-experience of the participants in the dissertation research. The steps are: (1) assume the phenomenological attitude, (2) read entire written account for a sense of the whole, (3) delineate meaning units, (4) transform the meaning units into psychologically sensitive statements of their lived-meanings, and (5) synthesize a general psychological structure of the experience base on the constituents of the experience. It is the first-person psychological perspective that is sought so that an empathetic position can be adopted by the end-user of the research.<\/p>\n

Applebaum (2012) Phenomenological Psychological Research as Science<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>:\u00a0Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of \u201cscience.\u201d This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of \u201cscience\u201d is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed \u201chuman science,\u201d is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That \u201cobjectivity\u201d is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require \u201cobjectivizing\u201d the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an \u201cinterpretive\u201d approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton\u2019s analysis of aestheticism.<\/p>\n

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Broom\u00e9 (2011) An Empathetic Psychological Perspective of Police Deadly Force Training<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>:\u00a0Police officers must be able to make an accurate appraisal of a lethal encounter and respond with appropriate force to mitigate the threat to their own lives and to the lives of others. Contemporary police deadly force training places the cadet in mock lethal encounters, which are designed to simulate those occurring in the real lives of law enforcement officers. This Reality Base Training (RBT) is designed to provide cadets with experiences that require their reactions to be within the law, policies and procedures, and ethics while undergoing a very stressful, emotional, and physically dynamic situation (Artwohl & Christensen, 1997; Blum, 2000; Grossman, 1996; Miller, 2008; Murray, 2006). Three police cadets provided writ- ten accounts of their deadly force training experiences in the RBT format. The descriptive phenomenological psychological method was used to analyze the data and to synthesize a general psychological structure of their experiences. The results reveal the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and behaviors reflecting the role of con- sciousness and psychological subjectivity in the participants\u2019 understandings and decision-making in the simulated situations.\u00a0-Published in the\u00a0Journal of Phenomenological Psychology<\/a><\/p>\n

Applebaum (2011) Amedeo Giorgi and Psychology as a Human Science<\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>: Over the course of the last fifty years Amedeo Giorgi has played a leading role in the movement to redirect psychological research from an imitation of the natural sciences toward a human science paradigm. He founded the first phenomenological psychological research program in the United Stated at Duquesne University, and continued his development of phenomenological psychology at Saybrook Graduate School. Giorgi\u2019s descriptive phenomenological method is a rigorous approach to qualitative research that is founded in the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The descriptive phenomenological method makes use of the phenomenological epoch\u00e9, reduction, imaginative variation, and search for essential psychological structures. Giorgi\u2019s approach to conveying phenomenology embodies a wide-ranging and incisive critique of empirical psychology\u2019s limitations, and seeks to establish scientific criteria appropriate for the study of lived, human subjectivity. -published in the journal\u00a0NeuroQuantology<\/a><\/p>\n

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Ferrarello (2007-8) L\u2019id\u00e9e de science \u00e9thique husserlienne et ses implicationes dans le cadre de la ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>:\u00a0Dans les premi\u00e8res pages d\u2019Introduction \u00e0 la ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie, <\/em>Pato\u010dka d\u00e9finit la ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie comme \u00ab\u00a0une r\u00e9flexion parall\u00e8le sur le sens autant des choses que de la vie humaine\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0: r\u00e9flexion qui n\u00e9cessite une science rigoureuse, ainsi qu\u2019une vision de la science dans sa \u00ab\u00a0signification fondamentale pour la vie.\u00a0\u00bb D\u2019une telle mani\u00e8re Pato\u010dka accomplit un double\u00a0 geste\u00a0: d\u2019un c\u00f4t\u00e9, il formule d\u2019une mani\u00e8re explicite son id\u00e9e de la ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie\u00a0; de l\u2019autre, il pose les termes d\u2019un questionnement tout \u00e0 fait crucial concernant les rapports entre \u00e9thique et ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologie. Il s\u2019agira notamment pour nous de ramener \u00e0 la source ce questionnement implicitement formul\u00e9 par Pato\u010dka. La science ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologique est-elle compr\u00e9hensible sans le support de l\u2019\u00e9thique\u00a0? \u00a0–published in the journal \u00a0Etudes Ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nologiques<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

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Englander (2007) Persistent Psychological Meaning of Early Emotional Memories<\/a><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\"\"<\/a>Abstract<\/strong>:\u00a0The effect of early emotional memories have been one of the most researched topics in modern scientific psychology. On the other hand, rigorous qualitative studies have been relatively rare, investigating the lived consequences of early emotional memories. The purpose of this paper is to report on some human scientific research results on the phenomenon, the lived persistent psychological meaning of early emotional memories. The study utilized Giorgi\u2019s descriptive phenomenological psychological method. A general psychological structure was discovered indicating constituents such as, the vividness of early emotional memories; emotional needs and coping strategies; everyday and life choices; as well as personal values attached to the meaning of an object that was present during the early emotional situation (a value experienced as contributing to the initial formation of an emotional life). The results might have implications for human service professionals in that they can contribute to a human scientific foundation in terms of understanding the persistent psychological meaning of early emotional memories as well as opening up for new venues of research on phenomena related to human memory, personality, and life-span developmental psychology. -Published in the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology<\/a><\/div>\n
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Applebaum (2011) (Mis)Appropriations of Gadamer in Qualitative Research Part I<\/a><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract: <\/strong>Within the Husserlian phenomenological philosophical tradition, description and interpretation coexist. Teaching the practice of phenomenological psychological research, however, requires careful articulation of the differences between a descriptive and an interpretive relationship to what is given in qualitative data. If as researchers we neglect the epistemological foundations of our work, or avoid working through difficult methodological issues, our work invites dismissal as inadequate science, undermining the effort to strongly establish psychology along qualitative lines. The first article in this two-part discussion is a Husserlian investigation of the meaning of \u201cmethod\u201d for psychology as a human science. This investigation is undertaken in the light of some researchers\u2019 appropriations of Gadamer\u2019s philosophical hermeneutics in the service of non-methodical praxes. The second article will address some implications of the attempt to structure qualitative psychological research along \u201cGadamerian\u201d lines, taking seriously the references to Gadamer\u2019s work made by researchers such as van Manen and Smith. -published in\u00a0The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology<\/a><\/p>\n

Applebaum (2010) Ricerca psicologica fenomenlogica come scienza<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Abstract: <\/strong>Husserl formula le sue ricerche fenomenologiche come risposta al momento storico in cui vive(va), un periodo di crisi di civilt\u00e0 in cui \u201clo scetticismo\u2013sosteneva\u2013si stava diffondendo, minacciando in generale di screditare il grande progetto di una scienza rigorosa\u201d. Per Husserl (1970) questo scetticismo rappresentava un collasso della fede nella \u201cragione\u201d, intesa allo stesso modo in cui gli antichi opponevano l\u2019episteme <\/em>alla doxa: <\/em>ad essere in gioco, per Husserl, era la fiducia della societ\u00e0 nella capacita degli esseri umani di dare significato alla vita individuale e pubblica attraverso il ragionamento (p. 13). La fenomenologia era destinata a combattere la dilagante visione secondo la quale \u201cla ragione non ha pi\u00f9 niente da dire rispetto alle scottanti questioni sudi<\/span> chi e che cosa siamo\u201d (Dodd, 2004, p. 47). Quello di Husserl fu un tentativo di ridare vita all\u2019originale significato di \u201cscienza\u201d, che sosteneva essere stato ampiamente dimenticato o oscurato dalle scienze naturali. \u00a0Quasi un secolo dopo, i seguaci dell\u2019approccio husserliano alla ricerca psicologica fenomenologica iniziata da Amedeo Giorgi (1970, 2009) incontrano una difficolt\u00e0 simile. Lavorando con gli studenti ci si imbatte spesso in un atteggiamento di scetticismo, espresso in affermazioni come \u201ctutta la conoscenza \u00e9 interpretazione\u201d, oppure ogni pretesa di verit\u00e0 riguardo a dei dati \u00e9 \u201csolo la tua interpretazione\u201d; o ancora, l\u2019affermazione che nella ricerca qualitativa \u201cnon esiste qualcosa come la conoscenza oggettiva\u201d perch\u00e9 \u201cstiamo studiando esseri umani e non oggetti\u201d, o la tesi per cui \u201cla ricerca qualitativa \u00e9 come la scrittura creativa: bisogna che tu sia un buon scrittore, quasi un poeta per poter trasmettere l\u2019esperienza umana, non uno scienziato\u201d. -published in Encyclopaideia: Rivista di Fenomenologia Pedagogia Formazione<\/a><\/p>\n

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photo credit:\u00a0Philippe Moreau Chevrolet<\/a>\u00a0via\u00a0photo pin<\/a>\u00a0cc<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/fb:like><\/span>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Applebaum (2024) A Phenomenology of Mindfulness Practice in Sufism in S. Ferrarello & C. Hadjioannou (Eds.),\u00a0The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness This chapter models an approach to the phenomenological study of practitioners’ experiences of mindfulness meditation. I draw primarily upon Husserl and Fink’s phenomenological philosophy and the existential phenomenological method

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