{"id":485,"date":"2012-07-16T08:45:31","date_gmt":"2012-07-16T15:45:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?p=485"},"modified":"2013-06-01T13:15:46","modified_gmt":"2013-06-01T20:15:46","slug":"amedeo-giorgi-a-life-in-phenomenology","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?p=485","title":{"rendered":"Amedeo Giorgi: A Life in Phenomenology"},"content":{"rendered":"<\/fb:like><\/span>

\"\"<\/a>In August 2011 Amedeo Giorgi was interviewed at Saybrook\u2019s graduate conference on themes related to his life\u2019s work in phenomenological psychological research. The panel was comprised of four former doctoral students of Giorgi\u2019s at Saybrook: Drs. Lisa K. Mastain, Adrienne Murphy, and Sophia Reinders, and was moderated by Marc Applebaum. This transcript was edited by Amedeo Giorgi and Marc Applebaum.<\/em><\/p>\n

Murphy<\/strong>: What would you say has been your greatest professional achievement?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: I guess I have to say it is the method I developed, and I had to develop a method because my first assignment as a phenomenologist was at Duquesne University. Most of the faculty\u2014or all of the faculty\u2014were clinicians, and there was no researcher. So my background is in psychophysics, and natural science psychology, my doctoral dissertation was on vision, my Masters was as well, because when I was a graduate student, over half a century ago, there were no alternatives!<\/p>\n

In the 1950\u2019s\u2014humanistic psychology came out in the 1960\u2019s\u2014if you went into psychology, you got natural scientific psychology. I happened to go to a school that had a strong research tradition\u2014there was a clinical program [at my school], but it wasn\u2019t as strong, the prestigious program was the research program, and I went into that program<\/p>\n

And with that background, then, Duquesne University was starting its doctoral program: the idea was it was going to be a program purely from an existential-phenomenological perspective. Adrian Van Kaam<\/a>, who was the founder of the program\u2014he was a Dutchman\u2014who gots exposed to phenomenology in Europe and then emigrated to the US, got his PhD at Case Western Reserve, and the way he put it to me was that he was \u201cshocked\u201d at the state of American psychology, that what was happening, Europe was already integrating a lot of phenomenology, so what he said was that Duquesne University had an undergraduate program but no graduate program, it was open, so he said \u201cLet\u2019s do one thing and do it well, and our perspective is existential phenomenology, and that\u2019s all we\u2019ll do, but for all of psychology, not [just] one field.\u201d<\/p>\n

So they needed a researcher and when I met Van Kaam he asked me\u2014he was taking Maslow\u2019s placed at Brandeis for one semester\u2014and I was working at the time for a consulting firm called Dunlap & Associates in Stamford, Connecticut and I was going to Raytheon at least once a week and Raytheon was near Brandeis in Waltham, and so Van Kaam and I went to dinner one night and that\u2019s where I really heard about phenomenology for the first time\u2014post-PhD, because I didn\u2019t get it at all during my training.<\/p>\n

And I remember asking him, \u201cIf I become a phenomenologist, will I have to become a clinician?\u201d And he said, \u201cNo, no,\u00a0you can become a researcher.\u201d And he gave me the names of European phenomenological researchers: Buytendijk, and Linschoten, and Carl Graumann in Germany, and so I realized there was a kind <\/em>of tradition doing research and phenomenology, and then he said to me, \u201cYou know you\u2019re really quite lucky you\u2019re in New York, and you should go down to the New School for Social Research because there are a lot of \u00e9migr\u00e9s from Europe who are teaching phenomenology. And so I took courses actually from Rollo May, at that time, he was teaching there, and Paul Tillich was giving a course, and the philosopher Aron Gurwitsch<\/a> was also there, and so I met these people, and began reading in phenomenology, and the more I read the more I liked.<\/p>\n

And I kind of had a professional crisis, because I didn\u2019t believe I could project over the next twenty five or thirty years \"\"<\/a>teaching standard psychology. And I didn\u2019t know what to do, because I was trained in this: I couldn\u2019t go into business, I wasn\u2019t a business type, and I was really at a loss when I met Van Kaam\u2014he told me about phenomenology. The more I read, the more I liked. So he invited me to come to Duquesne University to develop a research method that would be compatible with the existential-phenomenological perspective that existed at Duquesne. I started\u2026so I went there, of course I had to develop a method that was general enough and comprehensive enough, to study any kind of problem. Most of the faculty, most of the students, were clinicians, so I anticipated that many of the problems would be dealing with clinical sorts of problems, so I started to work with the method, trying to develop a method.<\/p>\n

Of course when I went there my knowledge of phenomenology was very limited, very slim, but the big advantage of Duquesne, and I haven\u2019t seen this exist again, was that the philosophy department was existential-phenomenological, there were ten or twelve existential phenomenologists, so what I did, every semester when I was teaching phenomenology I also was studying phenomenology. So I was very privileged because I got Husserl from John Scanlon, an excellent phenomenological scholar\u2014I once had a scholar say, \u201cIf you have a question about what Husserl would say, ask Scanlon, because he\u2019s just like Husserl!\u201d So I got a really good introduction\u2026I got Merleau-Ponty from John Sallis<\/a>, who is a very well-known scholar, he\u2019s at Boston College today, and I also got Merleau-Ponty from Al Lingis<\/a>\u2014Lingis is the translator of Le Visible et L\u2019Invisible<\/em>, The Visible and the Invisible<\/em><\/a>, that French work\u2026so, high class philosophers teaching philosophy, and I had to translate that into psychology: what are the implications of this philosophy for psychology? What would be valuable for me to carry over here to <\/em>psychology?<\/p>\n

So that was a kind of big effort during those years, and as I said, we also had European visitors\u2026from Europe, and Stephan Strasser came over from Holland, Paul Ricoeur<\/a> gave a course, Remy Kwant, another Merleau-Ponty scholar, and there was also a summer course, so for twenty-five years I sat in philosophy courses.\u00a0 And after I knew some of them, I just kept taking them, and I had courses in Kierkegaard, and Gurwitsch, and Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger\u2026so I really built up a background. And then the point was: out of all of this background, what\u2019s valuable for psychology? And for me of course, general psychology, not being a clinician, I wanted to know how these ideas could be transported? My primary responsibility was methodology\u2014I had to get a method developed. So I started in the early years\u2014the doctoral program started in 1962\u2014so the first dissertations didn\u2019t come out until about \u201967, \u201968.<\/p>\n

In 1969 I had a sabbatical coming. So I went to Denmark to spend a semester and a summer there, because there was a Copenhagen School of phenomenology\u2014you know, Edgar Rubin was there, you know he is famous for the figure\/ground<\/a> [distinction in psychology], and he was always in competition with David Katz at Rostock. Anyway, this was in \u201969, and this is when the student revolts were all taking place. The Copenhagen people said, \u201cyou know, we\u2019d love to have you, but there\u2019s absolutely not space, we\u2019re so overcrowded in psychology! But, there\u2019s a brand new department in the University at Aarhus\u201d\u2014it\u2019s a university on the peninsula attached to Germany there\u2014it\u2019s the second largest city\u2014he said, \u201cIf you go there, then you can visit with us any time, but it\u2019s a brand new department, with plenty of space.\u201d<\/p>\n

So they did invite me, and I spent a year at Aarhus, commuting to Copenhagen.\u00a0 And Rubin had died before I got there\u2026the Chair was a man named Edgar Tranekjaer Rasmussen, and another one, Ib Kristian Moustgaard, and From, these were the three phenomenologists\u2014so I had many conversations with them, learned what the Copenhagen School was about. But the main thing I wanted to do was to track down all of the main European phenomenologists who were doing research: I went to every country in Western Europe, you know\u2014France, England, Germany, Holland, Belgium\u2026every time I would meet [with them] I would ask, \u201cwho is doing phenomenological work?\u201d Plus, Van Kaam said to me, when I first went to Duquesne, \u201cIn Europe there are research phenomenologists and they are using a method.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Now, I\u2019m trying to develop a method [at that time], but I\u2019m saying, if there\u2019s a method already in existence, why don\u2019t I, you know, get a hold of that? Well, every person I went to, not a single one had a method: what phenomenology meant to them was a critique of mainstream psychology, but with no constructive alternative. So after these nine months in Europe, smoking out every phenomenological psychologist that I could find, I\u2019m still empty-handed!<\/p>\n

But\u2014I guess maybe its part of the American character\u2014I felt, well, do something about it! If you don\u2019t see what you want, create something! So I developed a method, I came back, and I said, \u201cWell, I\u2019m going to develop a phenomenological method.\u201d And I introduced a new course [at Duquesne] called Phenomenological Method, there were about eight students in the seminar, and I said, \u201cI don\u2019t know what I\u2019m going to teach you [laughter], I know that I read Husserl, who said you have to describe, you have to go back to description.\u201d So that semester\u2014it was 1970\u2014was the first time I taught the method, and of course over each semester I kept repeating it, and I modified it, and I kept the course going.<\/p>\n

And I would say developing a method where there was a vacuum probably is the biggest thing, and probably I would almost say \u201ctoo big,\u201d because it has dominated my life [laughter]. I didn\u2019t mean for method to take such a role in my life\u2014people heard there was this method, and they wanted me to teach a workshop, or go and teach. And my idea was to meet\u2026the task: Duquesne wanted me to go there and develop a method, OK, I wanted to satisfy that criterion, but then I wanted to go on to write books about phenomenological psychology itself. So, after fifty years of doing method, I\u2019m tired! I want to get on to a book on Merleau-Ponty, a book on Husserl, where I get into the substance of phenomenological psychology, not just the method. It has been a good thing, but also a distraction, in the sense that I couldn\u2019t let go of method, that\u2019s where everybody was pulling me, toward the method. So I hope at this old age to write books on substantive phenomenological psychology, what that means and why that would be important for psychology.\u00a0 So that\u2019s a long answer to your question, I wanted to give you some context why I thought that method was so important.<\/p>\n

Reinders<\/strong>: how would you describe the essence of the method that you created?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well, the essence of the method is looking for essences [laughter]. It is a search for essences\u2026because I come\u00a0from that natural science background, I really learned science and I appreciate it very much, and I don\u2019t want to throw away science\u2014I want to keep science in the picture. Now a lot of people think that because for years phenomenology was criticizing [empirical] scientific approaches, they were really criticizing the monopoly it had, not the scientific method itself. So it kind of got a bad reputation, as if, if you\u2019re a phenomenologist, you\u2019re anti-science. But anybody who reads Husserl cannot get that impression. He\u2019s a tough read, and if you read him, you appreciate science, and so\u2014one of his works is Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, <\/em>huh? So this was the idea that Husserl was trying to pursue.<\/p>\n

But its nothing like natural sciences as such, because its [dealing with] human experiences and human phenomena. So I want to be sure that our criteria is this: that every natural scientist will have to respect our method. I\u2019m not just trying to satisfy clinicians, or therapists, or humanists, I\u2019m trying to satisfy the most severe criterion\u2014natural scientists. And so they have to respect my method, because I anticipate that some day, when qualitative research develops and gets strong, the natural science people are going to criticize it. And I want to be able to stand up and say, \u201cGo ahead, criticize it\u2014but you won\u2019t find any flaws here.\u201d<\/p>\n

So that was the criterion that I always had, and the funny thing is, every time I go to APA\u2014I went to APA for twenty-five \"\"<\/a>straight years, before I gave up!\u2014I went because I wanted to dialogue with mainstream psychologists, with the research psychologists, you know, who I was trained with. And while I was easily invited to give papers with Division 24, Philosophical, or 32, which is Humanistic, or Historical\u2014I would go there, but all my friends come there [not the others]! So I was really trying hard to do Division 3, Experimental Psychology, because I wanted them to accept a qualitative [alternative]. One year they did, so at last, you know, I prepared a paper speaking to all of these experimentalists, explaining that phenomenology was equal to science\u2026and all my friends showed up! [laughter] What happens is, the other side never comes! So I thought, \u201cWell, I give up!\u201d<\/p>\n

But anyway, the essence of the method is the discovery of essences through the method of free imaginative variation. I would say that\u2019s what we do, we try to come up with the essences. But of course in psychology\u2014it\u2019s a psychological essence, not a philosophical essence. And that makes it a little trickier of course because [historically] we don\u2019t know what psychology is yet\u2014it is not yet an historical achievement what \u201cpsychology\u201d means. Nevertheless, I go ahead and do that\u2014that\u2019s what I would call the essence of the method.<\/p>\n

Murphy<\/strong> re: can you contrast your approach versus that currently being employed at Duquesne, which focuses on identifying themes rather than essence?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well, first of all a lot of people who call themselves \u201cphenomenologists\u201d [instead] come up with thematic analyses. Thematic analysis is not really phenomenological: they confuse the difference between the constituents of a structure. The difference is, the constituents are interrelated\u2014Husserl makes a distinction among parts between what he calls \u201cpieces\u201d and \u201cmoments.\u201d A \u201cpiece\u201d is a part that can be independent of the whole: I can break a branch off a tree; the branch becomes a piece. But then there are parts that you cannot separate, and he calls them \u201cmoments,\u201d so that the color green of a leaf is a moment\u2014I can\u2019t take green out of the leaf, OK? It belongs to it. So a constituent is a moment of a structure, it is quite different, it is interdependent with all of the other moments, it can\u2019t stand alone like a piece.<\/p>\n

Thematic analyses are like pieces, people do these analyses as if they were independent, and they get separate\u2014they get six themes, or eight themes, but what\u2019s the relationship between the themes is often not spoken to. And if anything, phenomenology is very holistic, it is sensitive to the whole. And so to do a thematic analysis and leave the themes independent is not satisfactory, at least according to phenomenological criteria.<\/p>\n

Now, if you have other criteria, it may be OK, but you\u2019re really an empiricist\u2014you know, like if you\u2019re doing Grounded Theory, and you come up with the various themes, that\u2019s OK because they are following empirical philosophy, not phenomenological philosophy.\u00a0 But we want to come up with an interdependent understanding of the parts, the moments, so I would say that if the Duquesne people have gone in that direction, they\u2019re departing from phenomenology, in the strict sense, because its not phenomenologically qualitative.<\/p>\n

Murphy<\/strong>: Might this be an effort to bridge with empiricists?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well, I think they just don\u2019t know phenomenology well enough\u2014you certainly don\u2019t undermine your own process in order to communicate. You have to communicate being faithful or integral to your own procedures and your own processes, and then you try to do communication, but if you undermine your own process in order to communicate, then its just\u2026then you\u2019re not communicating.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Applebaum<\/strong>: sometimes students who are learning the descriptive method think they can vary or add steps to the method, how would you respond to that?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: I encounter it all the time! I don\u2019t know what it is, but there\u2019s something about not fully appreciating what a method is and what a method means, and what a method can do. I\u2019m often accused of being a purist, you know? I mean, \u201cOh, you have that method and you just hold to it!\u201d Well, let me give you a simple example: how much is five plus five?<\/p>\n

Applebaum<\/strong>: Ten\u2026as far as I know!<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Ten? It can\u2019t be eleven? Or maybe nine, can it be nine sometimes? You mean five plus five is always ten? What are you, a purist? [laughter] In other words, there is a logic to methodology. In my method I\u2019m not doing what I want to do, I\u2019m doing what\u2019s demanded of me by the method, so that, if there are certain steps there, there\u2019s a logic behind all the steps, among the connections between the steps, it\u2019s not me, it\u2019s the logic, I\u2019m following the logic of phenomenology in having these certain steps. But students\u2026I think its because sometimes you mingle theories, they mingle theories a lot, and I do find students who sometimes say\u2026you know Saybrook has a requirement that as part of candidacy you critique a dissertation, and I always have them critique a dissertation done elsewhere, because you\u2019ll have a lot more to say, so if you picked a Duquesne dissertation that I directed you might not have much to say.<\/p>\n

So what I get are students who might say, \u201cI used a little bit of Moustakas, and a little bit of Colaizzi, and van Manen, and I did this step….” You can\u2019t mingle steps like that, there\u2019s a logical structure, you have to stick to the method, that\u2019s a requirement, that\u2019s a demand. You can change maybe with theories, you can say, \u201cWell, I took a little from Jung, a little from Freud, a little from Adler, you know I\u2019ve come up with my own theory.\u201d That\u2019s maybe a little bit more defensible, but you can\u2019t do that with methods. They are logical structures, there\u2019s a logic, there\u2019s a structure to it.<\/p>\n

Now, what maybe makes phenomenological method it more difficult may be that I follow the phenomenological criteria, but I also follow the criteria for good scientific practice\u2014and you have to know science as well. What does science demand? What does phenomenology demand? Therefore integrating those two can be tricky if you\u2019re not well steeped in both traditions, the scientific tradition and the phenomenological tradition, but I clam to be able to meet both criteria. I always say the method is both good science and good phenomenology, and I articulate that logic, I take on all the critics, and I say \u201clook, this is why,\u201d and I spell it out, and I have never received criticism on that, so far: maybe it might come, but so far I haven\u2019t. So the point is you don\u2019t play with methods the way\u2014maybe\u2014you can play with theories. Methods are strict like logic, its like suppose you had students who had trouble with the analysis of variance? Do you change the formula so that the student can do it more easily? No, [if you\u2019re the student] you say, \u201cI have to come up to understanding the formula.\u201d It\u2019s the same with phenomenology, you say, \u201cI have to understand these steps, and I\u2019ve got to implement these steps.<\/p>\n

And I say this because some qualitative researchers seem to say in their work, \u201cif you think you have a better step than the ones I\u2019ve proposed, go ahead, do it.\u201d But then that\u2019s not a method\u2014flexibility is good, there can be flexibility of a certain type, but not any kind of flexibility. So I\u2019m a little worried that if the so-called \u201cmainstream\u201d [psychological] people start looking at these sorts of qualitative research, it will be bad for the qualitative movement. You\u2019ve got to have high standards: you\u2019ve got to do the best. So if you want to learn something, you can\u2019t casually mix methods, you have to pick a method.<\/p>\n

Now you might do some little variation [on the method you\u2019re using] but you\u2019ve got to justify it. If you modify a method, you\u2019ve got to justify it\u2014its got to be logically consistent with all the other steps of the method. So I would say no, you can\u2019t modify methods at will.<\/p>\n

Mastain<\/strong>: If so many students are adding these steps, clearly they\u2019re having a problem with the method\u2026so what do you \"\"<\/a>see as the most difficult aspect of teaching this method to students, that students are struggling with?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well first of all, have you ever encountered students struggling with statistics? I have. The fact that students are struggling with the method is not a new phenomenon, that\u2019s all, its part of training. Now in my aim the hardest part is getting the structure, moving from the third transformation. That\u2019s always\u2014because it\u2019s an intuitive process, and by \u201cintuitive\u201d I don\u2019t mean in the everyday sense, I mean in the phenomenological sense. You\u2019ve got to be able, through imaginative variation, to see what\u2019s genuinely essential, it\u2019s a process, it\u2019s a \u201cseeing.\u201d<\/p>\n

I have also learned that sometimes, because people are having such a difficult time, to say, \u201cTell me what\u2019s the last movie you saw? Tell me about it, quickly.\u201d And then they\u2019ll tell me, \u201cWell, it was a mystery about such and such,\u201d and I\u2019ll say, \u201cWell, that\u2019s what you do to get the structure.\u201d You\u2019re giving me the essence of a plot. And I say, \u201cNow, what did you do [just now]?\u201d And its hard to do it and describe it. When I try to describe it I don\u2019t do it well, so I have to bracket describing it, and do it\u2014so then when I do it and show the outcome, most students will say, \u201cOK, now I see it.\u201d Well, how did I do it? I ask myself the question, \u201cWhat is truly essential about this phenomenon?\u201d I have the data here, you know, and I have to go through, but you know, I come up with it.<\/p>\n

Now part of the problem is, I deal with\u00a0is I often have students without sufficient background in phenomenology\u2014you don\u2019t get exposed to it. So the more you\u2019re exposed to philosophical phenomenology, the easier the task becomes.<\/p>\n

Secondly, you\u2019re also invited to do a truly original, creative task. Nobody has ever done this before\u2014psychologically. There are philosophical examples. Then you have to struggle with, \u201cWhat do I mean by \u2018psychological\u2019?\u201d As I\u2019ve said, there\u2019s no historical answer to that yet that\u2019s agreeable to the community of psychologists. I\u2019ve come up with that in my own sense\u2014that it\u2019s the subjective meaning that we attribute to things. What is the subjective meaning of this experience, for you? But you also have to say \u201cpsychologically subjective,\u201d because \u201csubjective\u201d is larger than just the psychological.<\/p>\n

Then you have to come up with an insight, once you have the right framework. Nobody has ever done that before. And if you have a different phenomenon, then you have no history\u2014its not that I can give you, \u201cWell, read Wundt, he\u2019ll give you\u2026\u201d\u2014no, Wundt doesn\u2019t do it, or \u201cread Freud\u201d\u2014no, Freud doesn\u2019t do it\u2026you can\u2019t read anybody, you\u2019ve got to do it without reading. That makes it difficult\u2014it\u2019s a new, creative task. Well, should we not try it then, because nobody\u2019s ever done it? I don\u2019t think science works like that\u2014even if it\u2019s difficult, scientists say, \u201cWell, try the task.\u201d So every student who does a phenomenological dissertation is creating something that never existed before, if you\u2019ve done it right. Then you have to reflect on that, and say \u201cWhat did I do, how did I get there? Can I articulate that for somebody else?\u201d And get it done. So it is genuinely new.<\/p>\n

You know if you really want to be a scientist working at the forward edge of things, then do a phenomenological dissertation on a phenomenon that nobody has ever worked on, and come up with the psychological essence of it. There\u2019s no place but other dissertations that I can tell you to read [for examples] but they\u2019re usually different phenomena. So I say, that\u2019s why that is so difficult.<\/p>\n

Reinders<\/strong>: Can you speak a bit about validity and reliability in phenomenological research\u2014this is an issue that often comes up in my work with graduate students.<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well, it is so simple in a phenomenological way, but everybody doubts it or doesn\u2019t believe it. You know part of Husserl\u2019s theory of meaning\u2014there\u2019s a threefold process. There is what he calls the empty meaning\u2014what\u2019s the technical word, I always forget that word\u2026<\/p>\n

Applebaum<\/strong>: [The intuition is] \u201cunfulfilled.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Giorgi<\/strong>: Yes its unfulfilled but that\u2019s not the word itself\u2026you search for a meaning, then there is a fulfillment. You see something that may or may not fulfill what started the search for the meaning. And if it meets the criteria of the empty search, then you have identification. When you have identification, you have validity\u2014if you do it twice you have reliability. I always give this example, \u201cWhere did I put my glasses?\u201d That\u2019s true enough for me anyway, I leave them on\u2026so I\u2019m searching for my glasses and somebody sees me, \u201cWhat are you doing?\u201d \u201cI\u2019m searching for my glasses.\u201d That\u2019s the meaning\u2014its empty because I\u2019m searching. Then, if I look around the room and see some glasses, it\u2019s a kind of fulfillment\u2014\u201cthere are glasses.\u201d But wait, they\u2019re not my<\/em> glasses. It looks [at first] as if they could fulfill, but eventually I have to say \u201cNo, they\u2019re not my glasses.\u201d Then if I find my glasses, then good, I can now see well.\u00a0 What triggered off the search was a kind of empty meaning, I had a kind of quasi-fulfillment, but they weren\u2019t identifications, [then] I got the glasses, I have identified.<\/p>\n

For Husserl, that\u2019s validity, because the fulfillment [of the intuition] satisfies precisely the meaning that started off the search. And if you do it twice or more, its reliability. So some people think its too subjective or too individualistic, or I don\u2019t know, too easy, but you see phenomenology trusts individual experiences\u2014with a critical perspective of course: you have to evaluate it, criticize it, which you do when you go from quasi fulfillment to the kind of fulfillment that you call an identification. So that\u2019s reliability and validity from a phenomenological perspective: it\u2019s all in Husserl, it\u2019s all right there.<\/p>\n

Murphy<\/strong>: I believe the term [you were looking for earlier] is \u201csignifying\u201d\u2026<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Signifying, yes\u2014the first search in meaning is signifying, it\u2019s a way of understanding my [seemingly] random activity, looking over tables, chairs, it\u2019s a signifying intention, then a possibly fulfilling intention, then identification: signifying, fulfilling, identification. Now, his theory of meaning is more complicated than that, but I\u2019m pulling out the one side [of Husserl\u2019s theory] where he says it\u2019s the same as validity.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s validity? Well, will this test really measure anxiety? Is this test really going to fulfill the intention I had? I had the intention of finding out how anxious this person is, I\u2019m going to give this test to them, I come up with a score, did that score really fulfill the intention I had? How well does it do it or not do it? That would be the identification. But of course at the empirical level its never perfect, you get quasi-fulfillments, probably, not true identification.<\/p>\n

Reinders<\/strong>: Would you speak a little bit about the realm of areas in which phenomenology can be relevant beyond formal research?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well I can say \u201canything experiential.\u201d If you can experience it and you can describe it, you can do a phenomenological analysis of it. Those of you who have worked with me know, I never dictate the phenomenon you\u2019re going to work with. Its hard enough to do a dissertation that you better like the phenomenon at least, because the process is long enough! So over the years as long as I have directed dissertations I have never dictated the phenomenon, I have let the student choose it, then I have helped them with the research.<\/p>\n

Well I have gotten everything\u2026in one sense its bad because I\u2019m not building blocks of psychological knowledge that I\u2019m interested in, but on the other hand I have a lot of happy students who study what they\u2019re interested in: \u00a0so I have, well, Adrienne [Murphy] was with breast-feeding, Sophia [Reinders] was with artistic creation, Lisa [Mastain] was with altruism, Dennis [Rebello] is working with telling life-stories, I\u2019ve had nurses do it\u2014if it is experiential, and you can describe it, you can analyze it. That\u2019s the beauty of phenomenology, it has a tremendous range.<\/p>\n

Mastain<\/strong>: Do you think you have to be a [philosophical] phenomenologist to do this, to get it\u2026to read Husserl, et cetera\u2014because there are lots of people who would like to get to the essence without doing all that reading!<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well, obviously the more philosophy you read the easier the process, the better the understanding, the better the free imaginative variation, the better the intuition, so I can never say \u201cDon\u2019t read the philosophers.\u201d The question is, how much do you have to read in order to do reasonably good work? When I was at Duquesne I was very lucky because the philosophy department was phenomenologists and any psychology student could take philosophy courses and have them count toward the degree. \u00a0So our students would get say over six semesters, six philosophy courses in addition to the phenomenology that we worked into our own [psychological] lectures. So they were pretty good, they were in really well-grounded, they were good, they had great background.<\/p>\n

When students have less background, the opportunities are not there to the same extent. So in the workshop course I give you the absolute minimum conceptual analysis of the philosophy on day one, but I always say: \u201cRead! Go back, and read!\u201d And I give you good secondary authors, so that you don\u2019t always have to go to Husserl, like Zahavi<\/a>, or Mohanty<\/a>, you know, people like that who are good, and you can get a good sense of phenomenology from them, shoring up, you know, your background so that your praxis will be better.<\/p>\n

The official title of that course is \u201cThe Theory and Practice of Phenomenological Psychology.\u201d The theory and<\/em> practice. If you only practice and you don\u2019t know theory, you won\u2019t do well. And if you only have theory and you don\u2019t practice, that\u2019s not so good either. It\u2019s both. So how can you get both?\u00a0 Well, if I catch a student early and can work with them over six years or seven years, they get good grounding, because there is the opportunity and the time to do that. \u00a0If I get a student, and they have all their coursework done, they\u2019re at the practicum level, and then they want to do phenomenology, I kind of respond [cautiously] like, \u201cWell, let\u2019s talk about this\u201d because I think you ought to have at least three courses before I will even let you do that, if its possible at all. So the answer to your question is, it\u2019s not good to have no philosophy, I can\u2019t argue for that, but I can argue for at least limited philosophy sufficient for you to do good phenomenological psychology.<\/p>\n

And the other problem is it has to be interpreted correctly\u2014reading Husserl can be off–putting\u2026he\u2019s very rigorous, very good, but he\u2019s writing for 19th<\/sup> century people, and unless you know the philosophical problems of the 19th<\/sup> century, you don\u2019t know exactly where he\u2019s going, so you need guidance\u2014in what sections to read, what sections to drop. Merleau-Ponty is far more user-friendly, because he knew psychology better, so if you read Merleau-Ponty its solid stuff too, but he\u2019s very, very much speaking to psychologists as well as philosophers.<\/p>\n

So if you read him\u2026Sartre, the early Sartre, is very good because he\u2019s very psychological\u2014the books on emotion and imagination\u2014and then again sections of Being and Nothingness <\/em>are quite good, in the descriptions of behavior, not the whole book, you need to know which sections to highlight and read. Heidegger can be very good, but he\u2019s so involved with the question of Being, so unless you know how to back away from that a little bit, you can get lost in Heidegger as well. So it\u2019s a matter of selecting the readings, and I find today that some secondary sources are getting better and better. I thought in my naivet\u00e9–the first generation, if I just explained to people what phenomenology was, they would just come aboard, well obviously that didn\u2019t happen! [laughter]<\/p>\n

And I thought maybe it needs a second generation, when that might get done, but not quite, but I think maybe with the third generation, because some of the philosophers like Zahavi, and Drummond<\/a>, and some of the younger philosophers who are coming on board now, are writing it in an English idiom which is much more accessible for non-philosophers, its getting better. So I think maybe in that third generation\u2026now I can tell people, \u201cRead Zahavi and then do the work,\u201d because he understands Husserl really well, but he writes well and he communicates well, so I think it took so much time because Husserl was so deep and so comprehensive\u2026there is a new two-volume set on Husserl by Mohanty, and it is awe-inspiring to see how much Husserl accomplished. He covers Husserl\u2019s whole life from 1890, The Philosophy of Arithmetic <\/em>to\u2026he died in 1938, and one book is called The Early Years <\/em>and the other book is called The Freiburg Years..<\/em>and in the Freiburg years especially, the topics he covered, the distinctions he made\u2026its no wonder its overwhelming to non-philosophers. If you don\u2019t know the history of philosophy, what he\u2019s speaking to, it\u2019s a very, very hard read. We need someone to interpret him and make him palatable to our task.<\/p>\n

And a lot is in there that is good for understanding science, for understanding human beings, for understanding consciousness, but its hard to get at without translations of some type. So I think the third generation might make it far more accessible to non-philosophers, but Husserl himself, as good as he is, I would say quite honestly, if I hadn\u2019t sat in on philosophy courses at Duquesne with expert Husserlian scholars, I would not have gotten him right, on my own: I would have read him, but pulled away with the wrong thing. They were able to tell me: here\u2019s what he\u2019s up against, here\u2019s the problem, here\u2019s what he\u2019s doing, so \u201cOh, now I see, \u201c but if I\u2019d read it on my own, I wouldn\u2019t have gotten it.<\/p>\n

Applebaum<\/strong>: Would you say that reading phenomenology not just an intellectual challenge but an experiential challenge as well?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Sure, you really have to stick with it, and you really have to really understand what they\u2019re saying\u2014not interpret too easily, and say, \u201cOh, he\u2019s saying this and he\u2019s saying that,\u201d because you run across a familiar word or a familiar phrase. No, you\u2019ve got to lend yourself to their <\/em>project first, then <\/em>critically evaluate it.\u00a0 I usually try to recommend Merleau-Ponty because he\u2019s more user-friendly for psychologists. But every mainstream psychologist to whom I said: \u201cRead Merleau-Ponty\u2019s Structure of Behavior<\/em><\/a> if you want to get a sense of phenomenology\u2014they never come back to me! That\u2019s a very difficult text, and it takes time. But they never come back and dialogue with me, but its tough, and that\u2019s the whole point\u2014that it\u2019s an experiential challenge as well.\u00a0 And it draws you seemingly away from current psychological issues, but it s a deepening of those issues, if you know how to come back to them.<\/p>\n

Murphy<\/strong>: The research method is obviously central to your life\u2019s work; how would you encourage those of our generation who have studied your work to communicate or propagate it more widely in the community? How can we contribute?<\/p>\n

Giorgi<\/strong>: Well in addition to teaching it correctly to others, that would be one thing, if you have the personality and the stamina, go dialogue with mainstream [psychological] people, you know, because the ideal after all is that psychology itself has to be changed. To me it\u2019s on the wrong track, it\u2019s not well-founded, it\u2019s got to get better founded and what I see in phenomenology is the proper founding of an authentic psychology. But it\u2019s a task that\u2019s bigger than a lifetime: it simply can\u2019t be done by one person, by himself or herself, so I\u2019d say that the two things are, first, teach the method to whomever is interested, teach it well and correctly, and the second thing is dialogue try to tell them that there is a qualitative method that is as rigorous as any quantitative method\u2026<\/p>\n

As I say this, I came across an Australian psychologist named Joel Michell<\/a> who measurement in psychology, he\u2019s a quantitative psychology, and his point is that the idea that psychological variables can be measured is an assumption and its never been proven. He\u2019d like to be the one to prove it, but he hasn\u2019t done so yet and he admits that. He goes back to S. S. Stevens who wrote \u2013when I was a grad student in the 1950\u2019s this handbook of experimental psychology came out edited by S. S. Stephens, and he wrote on measurement where there\u2019s the ordinal scale and he [Michell] says Stevens got it wrong, he didn\u2019t ground quantification properly, and yet fifty years of research is based on what Stevens said. And you know what\u2019s happening to him? He\u2019s being ignored as well. I mean, I know where his articles are, but mainstream people are going ahead doing quantitative research, they\u2019re not responding to the critique, so if qualitative research is vulnerable, it\u2019s kind of new, quantitative research is in no better place, he knows philosophy of math and it\u2019s not right, its an assumption, so everyone who feels like \u201cI\u2019m really being scientific it has never been proven that psychological variables are accessible to quantitative procedures.<\/p>\n

Applebaum<\/strong>: Another student had asked, how widely is phenomenological psychology being taught, it is being sustained today?<\/p>\n

Giorgi: <\/strong>I can name the schools where it is being taught\u2014it is being taught, it is being sustained. My view is that it will never disappear, it will never be mainstream, its going to be on the margins somewhere as far as I can envision it, I\u2019m not with it because it is marginalized, I\u2019m with it because I feel its true, access to that we don\u2019t\u2019 see yet, hit and miss, I\u2019m not saying that all mainstream psychology is off, but sometimes the successes are incidental, resistors to mainstream.<\/p>\n

I\u2019m also a historian of psychology and I can demonstrate to you that in every decade since 1879 there are people who have criticized mainstream psychology, I could write a history of dissident of psychology, like people like Brentano<\/a>, Politzer<\/a> in France, there is a dissident history of psychology, where these people are saying that mainstream psychology is not the best way of understanding psychological phenomena and the difference between them is not as great as the difference between behaviorism and psychoanalysis–that\u2019s a real big difference. The difference between the dissidents is not that great. So where are we going? In philosophy in America, phenomenology is strong: I just saw the schedule for SPEP, its quite strong, its good, there a lots of good young American philosophers, the generation succeeding me, good topics and papers. So I don\u2019t think it will die, I don\u2019t think it will be major or mainstream, I thin it will always be present as an alternative, and I think it comes down to an existential choice: do I work with mainstream people or do I work with the marginalized people? And phenomenology today is marginalized socially speaking, but not truth-wise, I think truth-wise it is seeking the essence of psychology.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Credits:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thanks to Saybrook University for hosting the interview with Giorgi in 2011<\/p>\n

Photos of Amedeo Giorgi courtesy of Marc Applebaum<\/p>\n

Copenhagen photo credit: Sigfrid Lundberg<\/a> via photo pin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n

Anatomical image photo credit: Curious Expeditions<\/a> via photo pin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n

Stairs photo credit: toastforbrekkie<\/a> via photo pin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n

Studying photo credit: beX out loud<\/a> via photo pin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n

Glasses photo credit: \u00bb Zitona \u00ab<\/a> via photo pin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n

This post is an abbreviated version of the extended interview first posted in three parts on The New Existentialists<\/a><\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n<\/fb:like><\/span>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In August 2011 Amedeo Giorgi was interviewed at Saybrook\u2019s graduate conference on themes related to his life\u2019s work in phenomenological psychological research. The panel was comprised of four former doctoral students of Giorgi\u2019s at Saybrook: Drs. Lisa K. Mastain, Adrienne Murphy, and Sophia Reinders, and was moderated by Marc Applebaum. This transcript was edited by

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