{"id":878,"date":"2012-12-23T16:09:37","date_gmt":"2012-12-23T23:09:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?p=878"},"modified":"2013-02-24T21:32:32","modified_gmt":"2013-02-25T04:32:32","slug":"broome-intentional-analysis-in-psychological-research","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/phenomenologyblog.com\/?p=878","title":{"rendered":"Broom\u00e9: Intentional Analysis in Psychological Research"},"content":{"rendered":"<\/fb:like><\/span>
\"\"<\/a>

Dr. Rodger Broom\u00e9<\/p><\/div>\n

\u00a0Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

The descriptive phenomenological method of psychological research is rooted in the intentional property of consciousness. Husserl (1983) modified Brentano\u2019s concept of intentionality, expressing it as consciousness acting upon an object or state-of-affairs that is not itself. In other words, embodied human subjectivity relates actively and passively to things that are\u00a0immanent and external to it (Husserl, 1977). Of course, Husserl did not limit himself to human consciousness as I have explained here. He addressed the philosophical level of the transcendental consciousness. Gadamer (2008) describes Husserl\u2019s project as an analysis of intentionality or intentional analysis. Giorgi (1985, 2009) developed the method inspired by Husserl\u2019s philosophical phenomenology, which is the epistemological basis of Giorgi\u2019s approach to psychological research. Therefore, I want to focus on the idea of data analysis within Giorgi\u2019s method as an analysis of intentionality at the psychological level of inquiry. The researcher takes the na\u00efve meaning units and describes the intentional acts of consciousness in psychological terms. By understanding intentionality the way Husserl (1983) explains it, the researcher can evaluate his or her own performance of the transformations in light of how well each describes the phenomenon within the form of intentional acts of consciousness.<\/p>\n

Qualitative Subjective Perspective<\/strong><\/p>\n

The purpose of developing a phenomenological approach to psychological research was, and still is, to better understand how human beings experience their life-worlds. While not being anti-quantitative, the phenomenological approach seeks to get at the qualitative aspects of mental life in a holistic way, in its lived-context, from the first person perspective (Giorgi, 1985, 2009). Therefore, Giorgi\u2019s approach to psychological analysis is an analysis of intentionality at the psychological level rather than at the universal level of philosophy. In short, phenomenological research psychologists do not aim at finding universal a priori facts about mental life, but rather to illuminate the lived-experiences of people in various kinds of situations. The purpose of using a Husserlian approach to intentional analysis is to get at the mental acts to see how they are synthesized by the mind into personal meanings. With that in mind, the researcher examines the personal meanings and generates a unified and coherent whole from the constituents meanings found in the analysis.<\/p>\n

Systematic Analysis of Intentionality<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>

Dr. Amedeo Giorgi<\/p><\/div>\n

In the descriptive phenomenological psychological method, our raw data consists of transcripts of research participants\u2019 accounts of a particular experience. The researcher may interview the participants while audio-recording their responses, have them provide their own written accounts, or even capture audio recordings during an experience as it occurs (Giorgi, 1985). Whatever the case, the raw data is a textual version of the account that can be read for a sense of the whole, divided into manageable parts called \u201cmeaning units,\u201d and transformed into psychologically-oriented expressions. These psychologically-oriented expressions disclose the psychological constituents that make up the general structure. Constituents are psychological parts which can be distinguished from elements or factors, which would be psychological pieces. We term the psychological aspects we seek \u201cconstituents\u201d because they are lived-context-laden, whereas elements are abstract concepts that have an identity irrespective of context (Giorgi, 1985). Phenomenological psychology does not seek to reduce mental life to a set of mental elements as \u201cready-made,\u201d but rather to discover how the intentional acts of consciousness make meaning out of sensory-perceptions, thoughts, feelings, motivations, etc. (Giorgi, 2009). Therefore, we examine the text in light of the structure and functioning of intentionality to transform the data into coherent psychological descriptions of peoples\u2019 lived-experiences.<\/p>\n

The intentional structure of consciousness is described by Husserl (1983) as Subject \u2013 Act \u2013 Object or Subject \u2013 Act \u2013 State-of-Affairs. A person\u2019s consciousness directs itself or points to objects or situations involving more than one object and their relations. Therefore, consciousness\u2019 act on the object or state-of-affairs forms the personal \u201caboutness\u201d for the person. Therefore, personal meaning and understanding is wrought by the acts of intentional consciousness. The first step of the data analysis is for the researcher to assume the phenomenological attitude and set-aside his or her theoretical biases. The second step is to read the entire transcribed account for a sense of the whole experience as it was lived. The third step is to divide the narrative text into manageable parts called \u201cmeaning units.\u201d<\/p>\n

Further, at this point during the data analysis the meaning units are converted into third-person versions of the participants\u2019 first-person accounts while maintaining as much of their original language as possible (Giorgi, 2009). As the fourth step, the third-person version meaning units are transformed from everyday expressions to psychologically oriented expressions. I have found that paying attention to the intentional structure of each statement helps me to more easily see how to more accurately transform them into psychologically relevant expressions. By seeing the transformations as an analysis of intentionality, the mental-act and object or state-of-affairs upon which consciousness is acting emerges more clearly and coherently. Of course, the Subject in the intentional structure is the participant\u2019s self-reference in the text. By paying attention to the Subject \u2013 Act \u2013 Object form, the researcher can use Husserl\u2019s (1983) imaginative variation on each part of the intentional act to get at the best psychological expression he or she can.<\/p>\n

When we analyze a physical object, we look at it from different perspectives and consider what aspects of the object are unique to that particular one and what parts are essential to its identity. In other words, the researcher mentally examines the object or state-of-affairs by taking different imagined perspectives and making modifications, like adding or subtracting or changing different features, to determine what is essential to the meaning and what is not. So the imaginative variation is an analysis of an object in the mind\u2019s eye of the research using the imagination to vary and see it from different points of view.Imaginative-variation allows us to look at the mental verb, so to speak, in the participants\u2019 statements and consider which psychological verb best describes what is occurring. For example, a participant may say that he or she \u201cassumed\u201d something because he or she later learned they were mistaken in fact.<\/p>\n

However, the psychological researcher can express the act of consciousness in this kind of instance as \u201cbelieved\u201d which is usually based on the way the object or state-of-affairs presented itself to the participant when it was experienced. In other words, it is the statement within the context of the whole and the use of imaginative variation helps us render the participant\u2019s lived-experience, which motivated actions or a response that was later found to be misguided, one of \u201cbelief.\u201d. Once the act of consciousness is expressed in psychological language, the objects and states-of-affairs can be described in a way that shows the intentional structure of consciousness at the psychological level of analysis. This is described within a phenomenological attitude, meaning the psychological transformation does not posit, challenge, or impeach the participant\u2019s point of view by making an ontological assertion regarding the experience. Rather, it simply describes what that experience was like from the participant\u2019s point of view in the context of the whole.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Example and Explanation of Transforming Data<\/strong><\/p>\n

Within the phenomenological attitude and using imaginative variation, let\u2019s consider an example of a hypothetical transformation using a popular nursery rhyme as our \u201cdata\u201d:<\/p>\n

\u201cJack and Jill went up the hill to fetch a pail of water. Jack fell down and broke his crown and Jill came tumbling after.\u201d<\/p>\n

These are the matter of facts about the incident and we can see what happened, but not how or what it was like. What is the relationship between Jack and Jill? Why were they interested in or motivated to get a pail of water? Why did Jack fall and how was it that Jill fell too? The phenomenological psychologist wants to get at the motivations, relations, perceptions, emotions and how the participant felt in the situation. The context of the entire story can be drawn upon by the research in the imaginative variation to unpack these which are explicated elsewhere or implied by the context. We recognize that when a person produces an expression, there is always more expressed than even the person was aware at the time (Gadamer, 2008; Giorgi, 1985). Suppose the research question\/problem for Jack had been something like, \u201cTell what it was like for you to experience an embarrassing slip and fall accident.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Meaning Unit 1<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Let\u2019s say we interview Jack and he relates: \u201cJill needed to get a pail of water for her mother and I accompanied her to help her because she\u2019s my girlfriend.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

The researcher would first change this into a third-person version of the statement: \u201cP\u2019s significant other needed to get a pail of water and P accompanied her to help her because she\u2019s P\u2019s girlfriend.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

The transformation into the psychological statement could be: \u201cP felt drawn by his affections and role as the significant other\u2019s boyfriend to accompany her to the top of the hill to assist her with a household chore given by her mother.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Meaning Unit 2<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Jack\u2019s first person account: \u201cWhile on the climb, I slipped and fell causing me to bump his significant other and knock her down too. I felt my head strike something hard and while I was tumbling back down the hill, I saw my significant other tumbling down too. I found out I had broken my skull on a rock\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Third Person version: \u201cWhile on the climb, P slipped and fell causing him to bump his significant other and knock her down too. P felt his head strike something hard and while he was tumbling back down the hill, P saw his significant other tumbling too. P found out he had broken his skull on a rock.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Psychologically Oriented Transformation: \u201cP felt his footing give away and he lost his balance which made him fall down, bumping Jill off balance too. P felt a crashing blow to his head as it hit the ground and he experienced an uncontrollable tumbling of his body as he rolled down the hill. P saw that Jill was following him down the hill in a tumbling manner like he was experiencing. P\u2019s later learned that he had broken his skull bone\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

I took the risk of stretching a nursery rhyme too far, but I thought it fitting to point out how context shifts the personal meanings for people. Moreover, those personal meanings are the \u201craw feels\u201d of the moments that lend psychological insights to various events. That is why the research question\/problem for Jack had been, \u201cTell what it was like for you to experience an embarrassing slip and fall accident.\u201d<\/em> Perhaps the sources of embarrassment were related to his relationship with Jill, the role of ushering her to the top of the hill, and his ironically being the inhibition to her fulfilling her task. Moreover, what might have wearing a bandage on one\u2019s head in public for weeks attributed to cementing the event as an exemplar experience of embarrassment in Jack\u2019s personal history? I trust this example has sufficiently met its task.<\/p>\n

Going back to the methodological implications of the transformations, it requires the researcher to be theoretically neutral by bracketing, pay attention to the intentional structure(s) within each meaning unit, and the use the imaginative variation to \u201csee\u201d<\/em> it from the participant\u2019s view point are required for making adequate transformations. Additionally, one\u2019s using a Thesaurus while using imaginative variation to find precision in words that best capture the participant\u2019s personal meanings through vocabulary is helpful Sometimes a researcher may understand the meanings to be expressed in the transformations, but needs lexical assistance for finding words that express them well.<\/p>\n

The Constituents of the General Structure<\/strong><\/p>\n

Once the transformations are completed, the researcher must go across the transformed data sets of all participants answering the research question\/problem. I make nominal categorical notes on each transformed meaning unit to \u201cname\u201d the meaning that is being expressed. Some meaning units express more than one meaning and I continually adjust the nominal titles (which can also be phrases) as I discover categorical like kinds of psychological experiences across the data sets and numerous transformations. Through this process, I discover the constituent psychological events and experiences that all of the participants had as part of experiencing the particular kind of event that I was asking about.<\/p>\n

Constituents are identified by considering whether or not that psychological meaning was essential to that kind of lived-experience. If a particular psychological aspect\u2019s removal would cause the whole of the structure of experience to collapse or fail in its unified sense, then that is a constituent of the general structure of experience (Giorgi, 1985). The constituents are assembled together in one coherent paragraph that lays out the stream of experience that was generally had be all of the participants of the study. This paragraph is the general psychological structure and regarded as the core \u201cfindings\u201d of the study.<\/p>\n

From Description to Scientific Dialogue<\/strong><\/p>\n

Like quantitative studies, phenomenological studies take raw data, transform it, and then bring the findings back to bear in the elaboration of the results and discussion with the extant literature. Quantitative research takes real life events, codes these observations quantitatively and defines them operationally. Each observation is captured in a numerical record which enables the researcher to transform the data through statistical analysis. After the statistical results are complete, the researcher brings the findings back into the real world and makes meanings through interpretations. Likewise, once we have a general psychological structure of the experience and set of constituents, we bring these findings back to the larger discussions of the topic we are researching. We elaborate on the constituents and use them with other literature to interpret how they pertain to other real life situations and possible implications for psychological theory.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

In sum, an important key concept for performing the data analysis in a descriptive phenomenological study in psychology is attention to the intentional structure of the participants\u2019 expressions. Typically, the verbs or \u00a0various tenses of the word \u201cbe\u201d (e.g., is, was, am, are, etc.) in the participants\u2019 relating of their experience needs to be refined by the researcher into specific psychologically oriented act-verbs or states of being to unpack the deeper and more precise meanings. The noun objects often need some abstracting because the personal identity is not as relevant as the particular type of relation he or she filled for the participant. So words like peer, colleague, etc. are used instead of the proper names. Other key concepts are the Husserlian parts, pieces and wholes concept and imaginative variation.<\/p>\n

One must understanding that the meaning unit delineation is simply a working-operation to create manageable portions for the researcher and not a division of the text into independent pieces by the researcher (Giorgi, 1985). This is not an atomizing of the text because the meaning units are still interdependent parts of the participant\u2019s account of his or her experience as it was lived. So the parts must be regarded as part of a coherent and contextual whole. Finally, the bracketing of theory or presupposed beliefs about the kind of event under inquiry must be maintained until the general structure is complete. In other words, the data analysis must be complete before the findings are interpreted. That is to say, we arrive at a descriptive structure before shifting to an interpretation of the possible implications the structure has in the ongoing scientific dialogue. Interpretation and explanation follows description in the descriptive phenomenological psychological method of research.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n

Husserl, E. (1977). Phenomenological psychology: Lectures, Summer semester, 1925.<\/em> New York: Springer.<\/p>\n

Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology. <\/em>F. Kersten (Trans.). New York: Springer.<\/p>\n

Gadamer, H.G. (2008). Philosophical hermeneutics: 30th<\/sup> Anniversary ed.<\/em> Ewing, NJ: University of California.<\/p>\n

Giorgi, A.P. (Ed.). (1985). Phenomenology and psychological research.<\/em> Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University.<\/p>\n

Giorgi, A.P. (2009). The Descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A Modified Husserlian approach.<\/em> Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University.<\/p>\n

Credit: Jack & Jill photo credit: perpetualplum<\/a> via photopin<\/a> cc<\/a><\/p>\n<\/fb:like><\/span>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0Introduction The descriptive phenomenological method of psychological research is rooted in the intentional property of consciousness. Husserl (1983) modified Brentano\u2019s concept of intentionality, expressing it as consciousness acting upon an object or state-of-affairs that is not itself. In other words, embodied human subjectivity relates actively and passively to things that are\u00a0immanent and external to it

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