"SECOND PERSON" PERSPECTIVITY IN OBSERVING AND UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION[1]

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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the "intentional layering" within an emotional experience that was examined in a qualitative research class devoted to "depth phenomenology." The idea was to approach qualitative data as a starting point for delving more deeply into an experience than a research participant might originally have been able to go. We begin by examining the method of access by means of which the discovery of this "layering" was made. In remaining faithful to Husserl, we shall talk about doing phenomenology from within the intersubjective relation and shall reflect upon what, precisely, are the "affairs" to which Husserl invites us to return.

> A face is a center of human expression, the transparent envelope of the attitudes and desires of others, the place of manifestation, the barely material support for a multitude of intentions.
>
> —Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 167

Introduction

It was Breuer and Freud (1895/2000) who taught us to look at emotional expressions as "symptoms" of deeper layers of experience, in their *Studies on Hysteria*. Husserl, who like Freud was

a student of Franz Brentano (1874/1973), was very much interested in grasping intentionality by means of a "coupling" [*die Paarung*] whereby we are able to experience the other's positings through "a kind of reflection" [*eine Art der Reflexion*]. But to what sort of "reflection" was he referring? Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968) would be the one who would eventually clarify this process by referring to the "reversibilities of the flesh," in which the other and I participate in the same structures of experience, allowing the other's gestures to furnish my own intentions with a visible realization. Could it be that the "kind of reflection" Husserl was referring to might be something along the lines of an *intercorporeal reflexivity*? In *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty would later talk about our capacity to perceive the body as the "surface of an inexhaustible depth" (1964/1968, p. 143)—after having earlier characterized perception itself as a "violent act" (1945/1962, p. 361), namely, "the act which makes us know existences" (1942/1963, p. 224).

I. Zu den Sachen selbst!

The battle cry of phenomenology was dramatically stated by Husserl (1900/1970) in his *Logical Investigations* (p.252): "We must get back *zu den Sachen selbst*—to the affairs of consciousness!" Here I am avoiding the common mistranslation of *Sachen* as "things"—if Husserl had wanted to say "things" he would certainly have cried out: *Zu den Dingen selbst!* But Husserl had no interest in *things* per se, insofar as things reside in the transcendent world, and the *Sachen* of which he spoke were the affairs of our lives—*what matters to us as human beings.*

Among those "things" that matter to us the most are our emotions, and it is to our emotional lives that we will turn in the current paper. In a recent qualitative research seminar with graduate students in psychology, I asked the students to write descriptions of a recent emotional experience, and then we selected

one of the descriptions for class analysis. Being ethically mindful, I asked the students not to write about anything that they would not feel comfortable sharing in class, in the event their protocol were selected for study. Furthermore, I gave them the option to change their mind if theirs were selected.

In selecting a protocol that we would analyze in class over a period of weeks, I was looking for one that was articulate, written in simple, naïve language. I also wanted to select a description that would lend itself to deeper reflection, though not go so deep as to disturb or otherwise upset the student. In the case of the protocol selected, the student had been an undergraduate of mine with who I felt I had a comfortable relationship, and who I felt would trust me to be gentle. At the same time, I knew in advance that I would not take the analysis in class to its deepest underlying levels, as those dimensions would most likely reveal the participant at her most vulnerable; hence, I needed a description that would be likely to generate emotional undertones that would be instructive to the class in conducting research interviews, without having to bare the student to a breaking point. In thus selecting the protocol to be analyzed, I let myself be guided by previous experiences of class analyses, in which I had to be careful *not* to take the class all the way to the deepest possible levels, in order to protect the student. Likewise, in conducting the research interviews, I tried to follow the example of Freud in his wonderfully written case of "Katharina," included in his *Studies on Hysteria*, in which he only hinted at the dimensions of Katharina's experience that might have caused her too much shame or embarrassment.

II. The Natural Attitude[2]

As psychologists, and especially as researchers and clinicians, we function within what Husserl called *"the natural attitude,"* which amounts to *a belief that the world "actually is" the way that*

it appears to me. As phenomenologists, we must rely upon the "evidence" of what is given to us in our own initial experience of the data within the natural attitude, to determine our assessment of the reality status (or lack thereof) of what our patients or research participants *tell* us. In our employment of the phenomenological reduction, it is the *other's* "believing" in the "actuality" of what they experience that we place into relief as a "production" of their own constitutive stance in the world: *We* remain in our own natural attitude as empirical researchers (as Alfred Schutz would remind us), "believing" (even if tempered with critical self-scrutiny) in the phenomenological "reality" of our participant's experience—and furthermore, believing in the fidelity of our descriptions to the phenomena observed. It is from within this "natural standpoint" toward our own experience that we then engage in the phenomenological attitude with respect to the other's experience. Hence it is what Giorgi (2009) has called a "partial reduction" when we take up Husserl (1925/1977)'s "psychological" phenomenological reduction, insofar as the researcher continues to "believe in" the "transcendent" psychological life of the other, even while subjecting it to reflective analysis.

Thus it would be proper to say that, as empirical psychologists, we are engaging in a phenomenology *from within* the natural attitude; and yet, at the same time, we are conducting a phenomenology *of* the natural attitude,[3] insofar as what is placed into critical perspective within the "intersubjective reduction" is the *other's* believing in the production of their own consciousness. As Sartre observed in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, "the ego is "compromised" by what it produces."[4] Within the natural attitude, then, there is no critical self-reflection on the part of the other with regard to the other's involvement in the world, and there is the belief that the world looks to everybody else in the same way that it looks to the other. It is precisely this *believing* (on their part) that we aim to suspend or take out of play in the

conduct of phenomenological research when we are inquiring into others' experiences.

Elsewhere (Churchill, 1998, 2006; Churchill & Richer, 2000) I have discussed the meaning of intentionality as well as what an "intentional analysis" would represent. To put it most simply, we are looking for the way in which a particular content of consciousness is related to a particular stance or attitude of consciousness. *"What" we see is always a function of "how" we are looking.* To perform an intentional analysis requires that one focus upon the "content" of a moment of consciousness and then, having made this moment "one's own" through empathy, to turn one's attention back upon this vicariously experienced "presence" in such as way as to be able to thematize *how it is that I am standing* (even if only in my imaginative uptake of the subject's experiential description) *such that I see what I see*? Husserl (1913/1982, 1925/1977, 1948/1973), for whom the expression "intentional analysis" meant the same thing as "phenomenological analysis," saw this as an "analysis which pays systematic attention to the parallel aspects of intending act (*noesis*) and intended content (*noema*)" (Spiegelberg, 1982, p. 692).

In the study of emotional experiences, we must place into relief the person's *believing in* his or her interpretations of events in order to avoid making the the error of simply taking those descriptions at face value.[5] For Husserl this meant taking the stance of "*non-participating onlookers*" (1928/1997, p. 222), and this is what we meant earlier by referring to a phenomenology *of* the natural attitude: a reflective analysis of emotional life teaches us that all emotions are sustained on the basis of one's belief that the world (the other, the situation, the event, or the emotional context) *really is* the way one experiences it. The person experiencing anger, fear, or joy really believes in the hatefulness of the other that justifies one's anger, the dangerousness of the situation that makes one afraid, or the perfection of the moment that makes one joyful.

III. The "Second Person" Perspective

In remaining faithful to Husserl, we shall talk about doing phenomenology *from within the intersubjective relation.* Although we cannot claim to gain direct access to the consciousness of the research participant, we *can* acknowledge our aptitude for *actively engaging* the experience of the other person so as to come to an understanding of the meanings of their experience. In recent reflections, I have considered this to be a *"second person awareness"* (Churchill 2006a, 2007).[6] One of the things that the "second person" perspective affords us in qualitative research is the capacity *to see beyond the moment* being described by the research participant, *to the broader Zusammenhang* (or psychological nexus) of which this moment may represent just the surface.

In cultivating such a *sensitivity to meaning*, the phenomenologist brings himself or herself to the encounter with the phenomenon in the mode of patiently "listening to" and "staying with" the self-disclosure revealed in the expressions of others. In slowing down and dwelling one becomes ever more *open to* what is being communicated. Heidegger writes: "Listening to … is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (1927/1962, p. 206, ellipsis in original). Heidegger informs us that through this listening a felt disposition gets shared—which is to say that, in listening, one finds oneself *resonating with* the Other.[7]

Husserl wrote in the second volume of his *Ideas*: "In order to establish a mutual relationship between myself and an other, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation … must be instituted. … Body and soul form a genuine experiential unity …" (Husserl, 1952/1989, p. 176). (It is, in fact, this personal and bodily relation that is the very foundation for the *trust* between researcher and participant.) The ideal bodily relation here would be the face-to-face encounter, but in principle one can institute a bodily relation to the other even if this relation remains

one-sided, as in the case of reading a self-report or listening to a recorded interview or watching a movie. What is essential is that the researcher be capable of "co-performing" the subject's intentional acts, their lived bodily acts.[8] Dilthey (1927/1977) called this process of understanding other people's expressions of life *Nacherleben*, which means "re-experiencing," "co-performing," or "re-enacting" the other's expressions in order to understand them.[9] Husserl preferred the term *Einfühlen*: He writes, "in empathy I participate in the other's positing" (1952/1989, p. 177). Husserl also described this as a "trading places." This empathic "re-positioning" of oneself in someone else's experience can of course be prone to certain kinds of potentially distorting influences: fusion or over-identification, projection, and sympathy. A heightened sense of critical awareness must therefore accompany this act so as to avoid any jumping to conclusions regarding the other's experience. Ultimately, the intuitive talent of the phenomenological researcher is being able to move beyond *what the participant says* of their experience to *what is revealed in the telling*.[10]

One of our modes of access to this realm is found in the body language of the person who is speaking to us, which is one reason I prefer to conduct face-to-face research interviews with participants so that I can observe them while they are elaborating their original descriptions. Body language such as facial blushing, or flushing of the neck, tearing in the eyes, frowning, and so on, can indicate that there is something else that is not being stated at the moment.[11] And thus one remains on the lookout for hints regarding deeper levels of experiencing that might at first not be accessible to the participant's conscious self-disclosure.

Thus we might find that a moment of anger may turn out to be a way of coping with an experience of betrayal, or hurt, or frustration; and this particular mode of the other's being affected in one way or another may be just the tip of the iceberg of a whole host of affective experiences, which in turn point back to a fundamental vulnerability. It is this working one's way reflectively from

the surface to the depths that has led me to think of this particular variety of reflective analysis as a "depth phenomenology."

What we call the "meaning" of the anger thus may be its relationship to an underlying frustration or hurt that the anger might serve to mask. The exploration of meaning takes us precisely into these "depths" or underlying "layers" of the psyche. It is indeed what inspired Freud to invent his depth psychology, which sought out the meaning or "intent" of the symptom over and above its material cause (see especially his discussion in *Dora*, pp. 56-61). The question is whether we can as phenomenologists engage in similar exploration without resorting to speculation, but rather staying at the level of description? One of the questions that the reader might want to be asking as we turn here to the lived experience being reflected upon, is whether the unfolding of the layers of emotional experience are arrived at here by means of simple description, or whether there is a turn toward something that would more properly be called interpretation?[12]

There is often talk of a move toward interpretation in phenomenology—one which I embrace, when it comes to informally applying Heidegger's notion of "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*) to the understanding of psychological narratives.[13] And yet, I believe it possible to stay at the level of description in order to thematize intentionality. That is, description does not have to be limited to superficial statements of fact; rather, it can also embrace the "depths" of experience—without having to resort to the interpretive leaps one finds in the depth psychologies of Freud and Jung, or to the more formal philosophical "retrievals" of the sort Heidegger engages in when re-thinking the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, or Nietzsche.

Describing what we see appearing in the experience of the other—in the face of the other, in the bodily expression of the other—is something we are empowered to do as living subjects ourselves.[14] Husserl's notions of *Ineinander* and *Verflechtung* (intertwining, interlacing, entanglement—similar to "coupling")

make possible a kind of reflection (*eine Art der Reflexion*) that is accessible to us as witnesses of behavior, through a "second person" perspectivity. Again, what I mean by this is that when we are being addressed by the other—when we engage in face to face dialogue—we are able to both hear the words that are spoken, and see (and hear) the rest of the story on their face (and in their voice). So I suppose the real question is whether "the rest of the story" is something that we are "reading between the lines" (which would be interpretation) or something given to me more directly.

IV. An Experience of Anger

In order to present both the experience and the analysis here, I will offer a summary of the data while commenting on it along the way:

<div align="center">A Reflective Analysis of Being-Angry[15]</div>

Mary[16] became angry when a co-worker, in the presence of other co-workers, described her as coy, and then another co-worker interrupted and said that he felt she was insecure. He stated, "She lacks a lot of self-confidence and that makes her insecure." Mary found herself smiling inwardly, agreeing with him "in the sense that what he said of me is how I in fact think others perceive me." When questioned, Mary revealed that she thought this (about others probably perceiving her as insecure) *not* because anyone else had ever told her that before, "but because it's how I experience myself." So at first the second co-worker's description of Mary struck a chord in her because it was familiar—we see that the deeper resonance was not simply that others have said it before, but that at bottom, Mary also thought of herself as insecure. Thus, we might say *that a deeper personal truth was being awakened* by her co-worker's off-hand remark.

On her way home, Mary became "livid" as she replayed the event in her memory. When interviewed, Mary confessed that she had been initially "intrigued by him and thought he was semi-at-

tractive" and described herself as "slightly interested" in him romantically. (Note the self-protective playing down of her own perceptions and feelings with the qualifying words "semi" and "slightly" which may have been chosen in light of the fact that she was giving this testimony in class to her peers. There was flushing of her face and a palpable blotching on her neck that occurred at times during her elaborations, and which signaled to me that there might have been some embarrassment for her in having felt initially attracted to this guy. We will return to this in a moment.)

However, as things turned out, "there had been no interaction between us, other than work-related questions." On the occasion when he blurted out her being insecure, Mary recalled, "he never looked me in the eye; and spoke of me as if I were not even in the room." She stated, "I found myself feeling judged by someone I believed had no foundation or right to judge me." Her description continues:

> I ended up calling my mom and yelling about how ridiculous this guy was and how I was enraged that he had the nerve to not only act as though he was some sort of authority on me and what it means to be me, but that he had even "treaded on my turf" and brought up psychoanalysis! This was thus a violation on two levels: Not only did this guy not know me or anything about me beyond cursory observation, he even went so far as to justify his case with something that I take very seriously and have more than two semesters worth of experience in (in graduate school).
>
> The lack of consideration this guy had, and the assertions he was so willing to make based on cursory education, is so much what I think we students of psychology come to dislike about being in the field—[having to deal with] those who think they know everything after a couple of semesters. I think such people degrade the field much the way "ambulance chasers" do law, and only make our struggle for reliability all the more difficult…and yet all the more necessary.

What is interesting here is Mary's continuing to "deflect" her co-worker's poignant (if rude) criticism—and its revelation of a

displeasing truth about Mary herself—by instead focusing on his general behavior as an illustration of how people "degrade the field of psychology," and by implicitly co-opting her classmates into also becoming irritated with the guy for his insult to their shared interest in the field of psychology. Beneath this layer of Mary's experience will be found precisely the degradation of herself that turned out to be the "deeper truth" of this experience.

At this point one of her classmates asked her if his behavior was not just a violation but also possibly a revelation. She answered "Yes, I realized that someone else knew how I see and experience myself." At this point I was thinking that it was possible Mary was staying focused on this "lesser evil" *in order not* to be made aware of the deeper offense: It was not only his dabbling in psychology that offended her (and about which she complained bitterly to her mom); but it was also, more profoundly and importantly, the deeper truth of his insensitive comment that really must have *hurt* her, deep down. We never drew attention to this in our questioning, and in fact always skirted around the issue as it was the one thing that none of the co-researchers felt comfortable to approach.

Mary would later write in her own research report, "My body is my experienced reason for my insecurity." Though this was never brought up during our class interviews, and remained the one unspoken dimension of her experience of this situation, it was nonetheless something which had become apparent to most in the room including Mary, who would later write that she was grateful for the compassionate stance taken by her interviewers (which included her classmates and the author). In her final paper, she revealed: "While I cannot hide my body, however, I do try to hide my insecurity. The new guy's comment not only exposed my truth to others, but exposed the truth to me of my inability to hide what is so fundamentally a part of who I am and how I direct myself within my world."

Summary

What we have so far revealed can be summarized thusly:

1. Mary feels insulted by a co-worker's remark about her.

2. Mary focuses on whether the accusation is fair (given his little knowledge of her and his lack of background in psychology), even though she admits it striking a chord in her as being true.

3. The more she thinks about his lack of knowledge in psychology and the inappropriateness of his remark (given the social context), the more incensed she becomes.

4. The focus of her anger is upon the way such comments "degrade" the field of psychology.

5. Beneath this, Mary feels embarrassed simply to have been made the focus of attention at work. ("Nobody wants to be the center of attention.") First the anger (at his poor representation of psychological insight and technique), and now the embarrassment, both serve to distract Mary form the underlying truth. In fact, these two "surface" emotions serve to mask her deeper hurt as a result of his remark, and the even deeper and more private shame regarding her body.

6. Mary's concern for the degradation of the field of psychology both disguises and substitutes for her concern about being degraded herself by a significant other (significant here because of his original romantic appeal, even if later she would turn him into a "sour grape," by her own admission in a follow-up interview). So beneath the surface concern regarding misrepresentation of the field of psychology lays the deeper one of shame and humiliation.

7. Mary's sensitivity to having been degraded cannot be assuaged by re-assurances from her mother because the degradation resonates with Mary's own self-perception: she admits finally, outside of the context of the research class seminars, in her final paper, "my body is my experienced reason for my insecurity. While I cannot hide my body, however, I do try to hide my insecurity."

Discussion

In her own discussion of the experience of this situation, Mary had this to say:

> In describing the violation I felt in the face of the revealing of a truth about my being I referred to the violation as twofold. The primary offense is taken as the exposure I felt myself subjected to, and the secondary offense was that his justification for his assessment of my being insecure was based by him on the premise of psychoanalysis. Having been myself immersed in the field of psychology for several years, I grabbed hold of its use in this experience as justification for my exposure so as to forgo facing the truth of what was revealed. There is an implicit attempt made to resolve the personal violation by suggesting that the feelings involved could hold some general validity—that others would agree with the legitimacy of the feelings of having a personal element of one's being exposed in a public environment.

Ironically, this was a "deflection"[17] of the violation at both levels (pertaining to the field of psychology and to her bodily being) by means of a substitution of embarrassment for the deeper lived experience of hurt and shame.

She went on to say this:

> In my experience, anger genuinely was a way to actively counter the passive feeling of totalization I felt in the face of the other. In the sense that my insecurity is something that I recognize as part of who I am, but not something I want revealed to others, the situation in which I found myself at work had in fact become too difficult to manage…. When I reflect on the experience now, I realize that my shouting at my mom about the violation I had just experienced was actually a reflection of the bursting forth of my body.

This, I believe, is significant because it represented an awareness now, on the part of Mary, that her body was more than an object of embarrassment; it was finally understood by her to be the vehicle of her subjectivity.

In an epilogue to her research report, Mary wrote:

As I think the described experience revealed, I do not do well with feeling exposed. I have a hard time allowing myself to be vulnerable to other people. I am always willing to listen and help others but only trust a very few people with my own troubles. I genuinely had no idea what direction the analysis of my experience would take, but in a way I knew that the issue of my insecurity, as the main trigger of my experience of anger, would be something I would need to be open to recognizing. … There are moments when I genuinely feel intelligent and competent and confident, and those are the impressions I want people to have of me. Those are the aspects of my self that I want to dominate over my insecurity. Having the truth of my being revealed to the people I work with was hard enough; having to *admit* that truth to my classmates was bound to be harder.

What I eventually realized was that if I wanted to accomplish anything during the course, I would have to be honest. I would have to be willing to be vulnerable before my classmates and try to trust them with my self-understanding. … That brings me to what I believe are the therapeutic implications of this study. What I came to realize is that in order to understand ourselves we need to allow ourselves to be vulnerable. To foster this, we need to engage in analysis with someone we trust…. I think that it takes a special type of personal cultivation that theory alone cannot generate to be able to engage in the experience of another person such that you not only understand them, but they come to understand themselves.

As a 25 year old graduate student, Mary beautifully expressed something I had first read in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* thirty-five years earlier (in my first seminar with Amedeo Giorgi):

Within my own situation, that of the [other] whom I am questioning makes its appearance and, in this bipolar pheno-menon, I learn to know both myself and others (p. 338).[18]

Concluding Remarks

We have attempted to show here how a sensitivity to meaning, cultivated through an apprenticeship to phenomenology and an attunement to "second person perspectivity," can enable us to plumb the depths of human experiencing while remaining faithful to the task of description. The deeper "layers of meaning" that were revealed in our class analysis of Mary's experience of anger were made evident not so much in her written description of the incident, or even in her words during our interview clarifications, but rather in our attunement to emotional manifestations during her face-to-face communication with the various co-researchers. Sometimes the class would be able to observe, from a third person perspective, Mary's pre-verbal emotional responses (visible in her face and countenance) as evoked while answering questions from one or another ("second person") co-researchers. These embodied communications – as understood from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's (1945/1962) chapter on "The Body as Expression and Speech"—revealed to us through direct intuition[19] an emotional layering of experience that unfolded one beneath the other. In attempting to talk about this phenomenon of "peeling back" the emotional layers of Mary's experience, we appealed to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body—as well as to Heidegger's notions of "bodying forth" [*leiben*] (1987/2001) and "shared foundedness" [*Mitbefindlichkeit*] (1927/1962) and Dilthey's (1927/1977) *Nacherleben* (which I simply think of as *resonating* with the other, in place of the more awkward "re-experiencing").

We saw in the discussions of these phenomenologists a foundation for conducting research interviews in such a way as to tap into the wisdom of the body in both the other's communication and our own perception of "latent" meanings. In the experience of dialogue, our bodies are alive to each other; we comport ourselves both physically and thoughtfully toward each other. Our speech refers us back always to the body, which we see "secreting in itself a

'significance' which comes to it from nowhere, projecting that significance upon its material surroundings, and communicating it to other embodied subjects" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 197). The words refer back to the intentions of the person who is speaking, and these intentions are lived by the person in his world situation through his body. They are perceived and understood through *my* body (see Churchill, 2001, pp 41-43):

> The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others…. It is as if the other person's intention inhabited my body and mine his….There is mutual confirmation between myself and others. (Merleau-Ponty, 2945/1962, p. 185)

Dialogue occurs between two beings who each have a body and language, "each drawing the other by invisible threads like those who hold the marionettes—*making* the other speak, *think*, and become what he is but never would have been by himself" (Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964, p. 19).

Genuine phenomenology is indeed a *practice*—and never just an intellectual pursuit—by which one discovers and articulates one's own immersion in a flux of experience that is the true source of all that we come to know and believe regarding the world. It consists in the realization that it is precisely one's own *presence to* the world that is the illuminating source and matrix of all that we come to understand about life. It draws us back to the ways in which the world *resonates within* our experiencing (or at the very least, it points us in this direction). And it is this resonance *with* the world that we learn to trust as informing our reflections on *what it is* that surrounds us, and on *how it is* that we are challenged to comport ourselves *vis a vis* our surroundings.

As phenomenological researchers, in bringing ourselves to the encounter with the other, we bring our bodies with us—and in doing so we are able to resonate not only intellectually but also empathically with our research participants" expressions,

both verbal and nonverbal. In reflecting back upon our class exercise, we realize once more that what are important are not only our insights, but how we arrive at them. Hopefully the reader can participate in this appreciation of both the "what" and the "how" of our research endeavour—and, like Mary, come to a better understanding of not only her own experience, but also the experience of conducting research.

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Endnotes

1. Paper presented at the 28th International Human Science Research Conference, Molde University College, Norway (June 17-20, 2009). Original title: *Reflective Analysis of the "Layering" of Intentions within*

Emotional Experiences: Towards a "Depth Phenomenology". The author wishes to thank his graduate assistant, Inge Saenz, for her careful reading of the *almost* final draft of this article, to which she made many excellent suggestions.

2. Here and in the next section, I take the liberty of expanding upon the more streamlined presentation of my original conference paper by means of some rather lengthy footnotes that create an imbalance between the first and second parts of my exposition, namely, the presentation of method and the presentation of findings. I've decided to use footnotes to elaborate methodological issues, so that the original flow of the paper can be preserved in the text itself.

3. Any apparent ambiguity here might be cleared up through reference to Husserl's distinctions, made in his early work *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), according to which there are three reductions: the phenomenological, the eidetic, and the transcendental. When we say that our work is undertaken *within* the natural attitude, we mean simply that we are not employing the *transcendental* attitude toward our own experience as psychologists. When we go on to say that we are engaging in a phenomenology *of* the natural attitude, we mean that we are performing an intentional analysis of the other's experience by means of the *phenomenological* and *eidetic* reductions in which we perform the *epochē* (bracketing the naturalistic prejudice as well as any potentially distorting presuppositions regarding the phenomenon) and then engage in an eidetic intuition of the other's experience by attending to its intentional structure.

4. In his book on *The Emotions*, Sartre wrote: "consciousness does not limit itself to projecting affective signification upon the world around it. It *lives* the new world which it has just established. … it endures the qualities which behavior has set up" (p. 75). The full passage from *The Transcendence of the Ego* cited above in the text reads thusly: "This is why man is always a sorcerer for man. Indeed, this poetic connection of two passivities in which one creates the other spontaneously is the very foundation of … 'participation.' The ego which produces undergoes the reverberation of what it produces. The ego is 'compromised' by what it produces. Here a relation reverses itself. … The ego is in some way spellbound by this action, it 'participates' with it. Thus everything that the ego produces affects it. We must add: *and only* what it produces." (1936/1957, p. 82)

5. See Churchill (2000b) for a discussion of how self-deceptions become a part of qualitative data and how we might reckon with this contingency.

6. I am indebted to Evan Thompson's (2001) book *Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness*—a thought provoking collection of essays which first introduced the idea to me of using the expression "second person" in my own writings. I also wish to express gratitude to my friend the late Michael Mahoney for first bringing Thompson's work to my attention.

7. In an ontological relationship that Heidegger (1927/1972) termed "*Miteinandersein*," there is the possibility of "sharing" an affective attunement with the Other, leading to a deeper understanding of what is being revealed in our bodily being together—with an emphasis, we might add, on what is being revealed bodily: *"Sie vollzieht die 'Teilung' der Mitbefindlichkeit und das Verständnisses des Mitseins."* (p. 162).

8. Even before his *Ideen II*, Husserl had much earlier opened the field of interpersonal experience to investigation. In his 1910-1911 Winter Lecture Course, Husserl introduced his ideas on empathy and intersubjectivity long before much of his writing on these topics began to appear in print in the mid-1920s. This shows that Husserl was concerned very early on with these themes; indeed, the appendices indicate that he referred to these lectures in subsequent years as his "lectures on empathy" or his "intersubjectivity lectures". While he does not deliver as much as one might like in these directions, he at least sets the stage for the direction that others have taken with his work (most notably, Merleau-Ponty). His discussion here of a "double reduction"—and of the givenness of the experience of the other within one's own reduced sphere of consciousness—contributes greatly to an English-speaking readership's understanding of a thinker who is often associated exclusively with his Cartesian-friendly "egological reduction". This text opens up the possibility for psychologists who would seek a foundation for a phenomenological inquiry into the experience of others.

9. Merleau-Ponty claimed that this reflective re-enacting could bring into visibility the opacity of the Other's consciousness—that which remains embedded in the Other's gesture. "It is thus necessary," he writes in *The Primacy of Perception*, "that, in the perception of another, I find myself in relation to another 'myself', who is, in principle, open to the same truths as I am, in relation to the same being that I am" (p. 17).

10. Here I am drawing a hermeneutic principle from Heidegger's *Being and Time:* the distinction between "what is said-in-the-talk" [*das "Geredete"*] and "what is talked about" [*das Beredete*] (1927/1962, p. 205). Heidegger writes: "What is talked about in talk is always 'talked to' in a definite regard and within certain limits" (p. 205). He continues: "Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences … from the interior of one subject to the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. … In talking, Dasein *ex*presses itself … because as Being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Being-outside—that is to say the way in which one currently has a state of mind (mood)" (p. 205). What I glean from this is that in "hearing" another's speech one is also "reading" the other's expressive body language (what Heidegger later would call "bodying forth" [*leiben*] in the seminars he conducted with Medard Boss for medical practitioners in the Swiss town of Zollikon—Heidegger, 1987/2001). We listen, then, to the body speak as well as to the words spoken. This is one of those places where I believe I may be willing to go "further" than others would in a "descriptive" phenomenology. However, I do not consider this move from what is literally "said in the talk" (the transcribed data itself) to "what the talk is about" to necessarily bring us into the realm characterized by Giorgi (1992, 2000) as a more heavy handed or agenda-laden interpretation, such as a Freudian, or Jungian, or Laingian interpretation of someone's experience. Having first learned phenomenology through Heidegger (1927/1962), it seems that I "always already" understand my own acts of "seeing" and "saying" as a *taking up* of the other's words in such a way as to "move beyond" them towards a deeper "truth."

11. Thus it is a fact of our expressive life that we reveal our being-in-the-world—which is our very "transcendence" or comportment towards possibilities of meaning—in and through our bodies. Sartre writes: "The meaning of a face is to be *visible* transcendence. Everything else is of secondary importance…. There is no trait of the face which does not first receive its meaning from that primitive witchcraft we have called 'transcendence.'" (Sartre, 1939/1074, p. 71)

12. See Giorgi (1992, 2000) for elaborate discussion of the distinction between descriptive versus hermeneutic methods.

13. "Repeating [*das Wiederholen*] is … going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there [in this or that situation]" (1927/1962, p. 437). He further refers to this repetition [*die Wiederholung*], in a rather elusive way, as making a "*reciprocative rejoinder*" (p. 438) to the speaker's speech. My own interpretation of this text is that in our *Mitbefindlichkeit* with the other we are able to "reciprocate" the other's self-presentation in our "rejoinders" (spontaneous comments and requests for clarification) that we interject at carefully chosen moments during a research interview. This does not have to imply bringing a theoretical frame of reference to bear on the other's experience, but simply being sensitive to the meanings revealed to us in the other's self-presentation.

14. The aforementioned reciprocity (see footnote 11) between Self and Other is constituted by the nature of the body as seer/seen, visible/invisible. The Other's gaze provides me with a mirror in which to see the surface of my interiority: "The mirrors ghost lies outside my body, and by the same token my own body's 'invisibility' can invest the other bodies I see. Hence my body can assume segments derived from the body of another, just as my substance passes into them; man is the mirror for man" (Merleau-Ponty, 1961/1964, p. 168). As a mirror ("a sort of reflection" or "reversibility") I re-enact the Other's existence by vesting in the Other's stance, gesture, expression a lived understanding of human intentions which *is* my presence to the world. Thus my own "substance" passes into the Other, and at the same time, I can assume postures, attitudes, and intentions, which I derive from my investment in the Other. The Other is a mirror for me in so far as he is given in perception, prior to my *thinking* of him as such, as another subjectivity born in the midst of my world. It is through the Other's behavior, which occurs in my perceptual field, that an existence other than my own is first revealed to me. "I know unquestionably that that man over there *sees*, that my sensible world is also his, because *I am present at his seeing,* it *is visible* in his eyes' grasp of the scene" (Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964, p. 169). One's face thus belongs to the world: "My outside completes itself in and through the sensible. Everything I have that is most secret goes into this *visage*, this face" (Merleau-Ponty, 1961/1964, p. 167). And finally, "A face is a center of human expression, the transparent envelope of the attitudes and desires of others, the place of manifestation, the barely material support for a multitude of intentions" (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 167). This

last statement is the very foundation for the analysis undertaken in this study!

15. The class procedure of data analysis was adapted from Giorgi (2009) but also informed by Colaizzi (1973, 1978, 2001) and Fischer (1974, 1978)—as well as, more recently, Embree (2006). The author's own synthesis of these sources is articulated in Churchill (1998, 2006) and Churchill, Lowery, McNally & Rao (1998).

16. I wish to thank my student Marilyn Austin for being brave enough to enter into a relationship of deep vulnerability in the face of her co-researchers, and for having the depth of character to be able to grow from the experience. Using the pseudonym "Mary" made it easier for the author to tread upon delicate dimensions of the research participant's experience. She was a "co-researcher" in every sense intended by von Eckartsberg (1971) in his original use of this expression to designate the "subjects" of psychological research (who have not always been regarded in their full humanity in the history of psychological research). Entering into a dialogal relationship with the persons opening themselves to you in qualitative research interviews sometimes means finding it difficult to *not* go into *too* much personal detail in writing up one's findings. A pseudonym can soften the impact of one's own discoveries during the descriptive phase of research (which follows the observation and analysis phases). See Spiegelberg (1975 and 1983 pp. 681-715) for illuminating elaborations of the phases (intuiting, analyzing, describing) encountered in doing phenomenology.

17. One might say, more simply, that there was a "moving away" from the violation at both levels; though, I do not use the term "deflection" in any formal way but merely with intent to describe a process whereby one hides something from oneself.

18. Merleau-Ponty continues: "I am sitting before my subject and chatting with him; he is trying to describe to me what he 'sees' and what he 'hears'; it is not a question of either taking him at his word, or sticking to my own point of view, but of making explicit my experience, and also his experience as it is conveyed to me in my own … and to understand one through the other." (1945/1962, p. 338)

19. See Colaizzi (2002) for an illuminating discussion of the meaning of the term *intuition* in recent German philosophy.