Who’s Afraid of Forms? is an advanced summer program in phenomenological philosophy to be held July 1-4, 2013 at the University of Calabria. Seminars, delivered in English, will be led by Professors De Warren, Hopkins, Majolino and Palombi, and will address topics in the philosophy of science, ontology, ethics and politics. For details consult the program. To participate, please

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I love Teo and Febbraro’s (2002) observation that “Psychology’s history can be studied as a history of fads” (p. 458). Teo (1996) has written that psychologists “have tended to value meta-theoretical constructions from outside their discipline more than those from inside their disciplines,” with the popularity of these constructions shifting as one or another current

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I’m happy to expand the linguistic diversity of our blog with this post of mine in Portuguese, which I offer with deep gratitude to the colleagues who volunteered to translate it: Eu ensino uma introdução à investigação psicológica para estudantes de doutorado que dura um ano. Muitos dos meus alunos são psicoterapeutas ou estão em

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Here is a link to a beautiful essay of Akihiro Yoshida’s, On Tamamushi-iro Expression: A Phenomenological Explication of Tamamushi-iro-no (Intendedly Ambiguous) Expressive Acts. Dr. Yoshida is Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo, and Professor of Psychology, Shukutoku University. In Japanese, he writes, tamamushi-iro-no expressions are those that, when spoken, lend themselves to multiple differing interpretations by the one to whom they

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This year’s annual meeting of ICNAP (Interdisciplinary Coalition of North-American Phenomenologists) will meet in May at Ramapo College in New Jersey. Dr. Frederick Wertz is President of ICNAP, and we’re happy to post his invitation followed by submission details below. Dear Colleague, The Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists (ICNAP) conference, “Understanding Embodiment,” will be

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Students new to phenomenological psychology often ask me what’s the difference between Clark Moustakas’ and Amedeo Giorgi’s research methods, since both approaches are called “phenomenological.” In fact there are major differences: in this post I’ll examine Moustakas’ Phenomenological Research Methods (1994) from the perspective of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy. Naturally I’ll also be speaking as

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Reading J. N. Mohanty’s essay “Husserl’s Concept of Intentionality” in Analecta Husserliana I (1971), the following passage, discussing the Logische Untersuchungen, stood out to me: “The static analysis lays bare the structure of what is called an intentional act whereby the word ‘act’ has to be taken not in its ordinary usage as meaning an activity or a process, but

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Dr. Susi Ferrarello opened our January 2013 graduate seminar on Descriptive Phenomenological Psychology with this introductory lecture–her aim was to acquaint Saybrook’s doctoral psychology students with the tradition of philosophical inquiry in which Husserl’s phenomenology is situated. You’ll see her presentation was a wide-ranging invitation to participate in the questioning that is the philosophical tradition–

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In May 2013 Ramapo College in New Jersey will host the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists’ annual meeting. This year’s theme is “Understanding Embodiment,” and is open to a wide variety of topics. The submission deadline is February 1, 2013–for more details, read the call here: ICNAP V call for papers        

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 Introduction The descriptive phenomenological method of psychological research is rooted in the intentional property of consciousness. Husserl (1983) modified Brentano’s concept of intentionality, expressing it as consciousness acting upon an object or state-of-affairs that is not itself. In other words, embodied human subjectivity relates actively and passively to things that are immanent and external to it

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