Introduction Intersubjectivity can be described as a relationship between me and an other. The peculiarity of this relationship lies in the fact that the other is not alien to me, but is “within me” in a way that his or her “otherness” can be investigated beginning with the way in which that “otherness” is imminent

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The students who put this question to me are usually taking their first course in phenomenological or hermeneutic (narrative) psychological research. And in a way, I feel for them, because many of them didn’t expect to be facing something called “epistemology,” and bumping into any number of arcane Greek terms that seem to bear no

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Shogo Tanaka’s site Embodied Knowledge, with which I’ve just become acquainted, approaches the philosophy and psychology of embodiment through the lens of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Tanaka teaches at Tokai University in Japan, and he is particularly interested in the dialogue between phenomenological philosophy and empirical sciences such as “neuroscience, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, robotics, etc.”

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This PowerPoint presentation accompanied my 2-day graduate seminar  introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological research of Wertz, Halling, and Englander. The seminar was offered as an introduction for students who may never have encountered phenomenology before; its aim was to give students a sense of the kinds of questions descriptive phenomenologists ask, the careful

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I recently posted a short discussion of what “the natural attitude” means in Husserl’s phenomenology. As I mentioned, the natural attitude is the perspective of everyday life. For Husserl the process he calls the phenomenological reduction is the means by which the phenomenologist frees himself from the reifications of the natural attitude, gaining a standpoint

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